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Securities Regulation
The U.S. securities laws have repeatedly been assailed as burdensome or
ineffective. Reform efforts have conversely been attacked for undermining an
effective mechanism by which shareholders can discipline management.
Moreover, even reformers have been dissatisfied with the effectiveness of their
product. For example, after enacting the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995,1 members of Congress became concerned that their efforts to
rein in frivolous private lawsuits under the federal securities laws were being
circumvented by state court filings and introduced legislation to preempt such
action.2 There is some validity to their concern: In a report to President
Clinton on the impact of the 1995 Act, the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) cited preliminary studies indicating a decrease in federal
court filings and an increase in state court filings.3
This Article contends that the current legislative approach to securities
regulation is mistaken and that preemption is not the solution to frivolous
lawsuits. It advocates instead a market-oriented approach of competitive
federalism that would expand, not reduce, the role of the states in securities
regulation. It thereby would fundamentally reconceptualize our regulatory
approach and is at odds with both sides of the debate over the 1995 Act, each
of which has sought to use national laws as a weapon to beat down its
opponent's position by monopolizing the regulatory field.
The market approach to securities regulation advocated in this Article takes
as its paradigm the successful experience of the U.S. states in corporate law,
in which the fifty states and the District of Columbia compete for the business
of corporate charters. There is a substantial literature on this particular
manifestation of U.S. federalism indicating that shareholders have benefited
from the federal system of corporate law by its production of corporate codes
that, for the most part, maximize share value.4 This Article proposes extending
the competition among states for corporate charters to two of the three
principal components of federal securities regulation: the registration of
securities and the related continuous disclosure regime for issuers; and the
antifraud provisions that police that system. The third component, the
regulation of market professionals, is not included in the proposed reform. The
1. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 (Vest 1997)).
2. See Securities Litigation Improvement Act of 1997. H.R. 1653. 105th Cong.; Secunties Litgation
Uniform Standards Act, H.R. 1689, 105th Cong. (1997).
3. See U.S. SEc. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS ON THE FIRST
YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LmGATION REFORi ACT OF 1995, pt. IV. at 22, pl.
VII, at 72 (1997) (summarizing a study by National Economic Research Associates of securiues litigation
filings after the Act). Joseph Grundfest and Michael Perino also document a shift to state court filings. See
JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURmEs LITIGATION REFoPJm: THE FIRST YEAR's
EXPERIENCE (Stanford Law School, John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 140, 1997).
More recent data, however, suggest a reversal of this trend, with state filings declining and federal filings
increasing in the first half of 1997. See 1995 Private Securities Litigation Reform Act: Federal Securities
Class Action Filings Rise as State Filings Fall. NERA Finds, 29 Sec. Reg. & L Rep. (BNA) 1001 (July
18, 1997).
4. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw (1993).
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proposed market approach can be implemented by modifying the federal
securities laws in favor of a menu approach to securities regulation under
which firms elect whether to be covered by federal law or by the securities law
of a specified state, such as their state of incorporation.
Under a system of competitive federalism for securities regulation, only
one sovereign would have jurisdiction over all transactions in the securities of
a corporation that involve the issuer or its agents and investors. The aim is to
replicate for the securities setting the benefits produced by state competition
for corporate charters-a responsive legal regime that has tended to maximize
share value-and thereby eliminate the frustration experienced at efforts to
reform the national regime. As a competitive legal market supplants a
monopolist federal agency in the fashioning of regulation, it would produce
rules more aligned with the preferences of investors, whose decisions drive the
capital market.
Competitive federalism for U.S. securities regulation also has important
implications for international securities regulation. The jurisdictional principle
applicable to domestic securities transactions is equally applicable to
international securities transactions: Foreign issuers selling shares in the United
States could opt out of the federal securities laws and choose those of another
nation, such as their country of incorporation, or those of a U.S. state, to
govern transactions in their securities in the United States. The federal
securities laws would also, of course, not apply to transactions by U.S.
investors abroad in the shares of firms that opt for a non-U.S. securities
domicile. Under this approach, U.S. law would apply only to corporations
affirmatively opting to be covered by U.S. law, whether they be U.S.- or non-
U.S.-based firms. It therefore would put an end to the ever-expanding
extraterritorial reach of U.S. securities regulation, which currently extends to
transactions abroad involving foreign firms, as long as there are any U.S.
shareholders or U.S. effects.
Stemming the trend of extraterritorial application of U.S. law will not harm
U.S. investors because they have, in fact, often been disadvantaged by the
expansion of U.S. securities jurisdiction. For example, to avoid the application
of U.S. law, foreign firms have frequently explicitly excluded U.S. investors
from takeover offers, and such investors have thus missed out on bid
premiums.' In addition, adoption of the market approach would facilitate
foreign firms' access to capital, as they would be able to issue securities in the
United States without complying with U.S. disclosure and accounting rules that
differ substantially from their home rules, a requirement that has been a
5. For a discussion of SEC and court efforts at extraterritorial coverage in the context of securities
regulation of takeover bids, see Arthur R. Pinto, The Internationalization of the Hostile Takeover Market:
Its Implications for Choice of Law in Corporate and Securities Law, 16 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 55 (1990).
6. See id. at 66-76.
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significant deterrent to listings.' This consequence of the proposed
modification of U.S. law would also benefit U.S. investors, who would no
longer incur the higher transaction costs of purchasing shares abroad in order
to make direct investments in foreign firms.
The market approach to securities regulation is a natural extension of the
literature on state competition for corporate charters, and commentators,
recognizing the possibility of this extension, have occasionally mentioned it as
an alternative to the current system of securities regulation. s Advancing those
earlier suggestions, this Article makes a systematic case for competitive
federalism by articulating the rationales for the approach and by crafting the
mechanics of its implementation. The position advocated in this
Article-elimination of the exclusive mandatory character of most of the
federal securities laws-may seem on first impression to many readers
surprising, if not unrealistic or worse. In my judgment, a compelling case can
be made on the substantive merits of the proposal.
There may be an understandable desire to discount the need for the
proposal because of the vibrancy of U.S. capital markets and the calls for
piecemeal reform rather than comprehensive revamping of the current regime
by issuers and investors. This would be a mistake. While U.S. capital markets
are the largest and most liquid in the world, it is incorrect to attribute this fact
to the federal regime. U.S. capital markets were the largest and most liquid
global markets at the turn of the century,9 before the federal regime was
established, and their share of global capitalization has declined markedly over
the past two decades,'0 facts at odds with the contention that the current
federal regime is the reason for the depth of U.S. capital markets. The absence
of calls for comprehensive reform is a function of a lack of imagination, rather
than evidence that the current regulatory apparatus does not produce
7. See Franklin R. Edwards, SEC Requirements for Trading of Foreign Securities on U.S. Erchanges,
in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURmES REGULATION: ECONOMIC AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 57. 57-58 (Kenneth
Lehn & Robert W. Kamphuis, Jr. eds., 1992) [hereinafter MODERNZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION].
8. See, e.g., ROMANO, supra note 4, at 99-100. 107-08; Jonathan R. Macey. Administrative Agency
Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty. 15 CARDozo L. REv. 909,
935-36 (1994); JEFFREY G. MACINTOSH, INTERNATIONAL SECURmE REGULATION: OF CO.M'PETrMON,
COOPERATION, CONVERGENCE, AND CARTELIZATION 31-32 (University of Toronto Faculty of Law. Law
& Econ. Working Paper WPS-48, 1996).
9. See R.C. MICHIE, THE LONDON AND NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGES 1850-1914, at 34 (1987)
(arguing that the New York exchange gained preeminence among world's security markets from World
War I).
10. See BRUNO SOLNIK, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS 168 cxh.6.1 (3d ed. 1996) (reporting that the
U.S. share of global capitalization dropped from 57% to 36% between 1974 and 1994). With the recent
market boom, the U.S. share rose to 41% in 1996. See IBBOTSON ASSOCS.. Al/RI GLOBAL PORTFOUO
INTENSIVE CLASSROOM PROGRAM 1997, at Day I -16 (1997) (citing Developed Markets. MORGAN STANLEY
CAPITAL INT'L EAFE AND WORLD PERSPECTIVE (Morgan Stanley Capital lnt'l. New York. N.Y.). Jan.
1996, at 5; IFC EMERGING MARKET DATA BASE MONTHLY REVIEW OF EMERGING STOCK MARKETS 8
(n.d.)).
1998] 2363
The Yale Law Journal
deadweight losses." Blind adherence to the securities regulation status quo
imposes real costs on investors and firms, and there is a better solution.
Some may conclude that the proposal does not go far enough, and that all
government interference in capital markets, whether federal or state, should be
abolished. I believe that the intermediate position advocated in this Article is
a more sensible public policy than eliminating all government involvement.
This is because state competition does not foreclose the possibility of
deregulation should that be desired by investors: A state could adopt a
securities regime that delegates regulatory authority over issuers to stock
exchanges, just as the current federal regime delegates regulatory authority for
market professionals to the stock exchanges and National Association of
Securities Dealers (NASD). State competition permits experimentation with
purely private regulatory arrangements, while retaining a mechanism to reverse
course easily-migration to states that do not adopt such an approach-which
is not present in a purely private regime. On a more pragmatic level, there is
a more immediate point to the Article: to caution against the current impetus
to extend the federal government's monopoly over securities regulation. Instead
of supplanting state securities regulation, Congress should rationalize it by
legislatively altering the multijurisdictional, transactional basis of state
regulatory authority to an issuer-domicile basis.
The argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, a market-based approach to
U.S. securities regulation is outlined, and the mandatory federal system is
critiqued. The rationale for excluding from the proposal the third component
of the federal securities regime, the regulation of market professionals, and
comparisons with alternative market-oriented reforms, such as regulation by
exchanges, are also provided. Part II discusses the details for implementing the
proposal, including changing the current choice-of-law rule for securities
transactions from one that focuses on the site of the transaction to an issuer-
based approach analogous to the internal affairs rule applied in corporate law,
and conditioning opting out of the federal regime upon compliance with two
procedural requirements. The requirements, which seek to ensure the integrity
of the investor decisions that drive the regulatory competition, are the
disclosure of the issuer's securities domicile at the time of a security purchase
and a shareholder vote to effectuate a change in securities domicile. Finally,
Part III extends the proposal to international securities regulation.
11. Issuers have focused their efforts on removing regulatory authority from the states to the federal
level because they have not recognized the possibility of removing the source of the state-level problems
of plaintiff forum shopping and burdensome registration requirements. Such problems could be solved by
altering the state jurisdictional rule of investor domicile to that proposed in this Article, under which only
one state, chosen by the issuer as its securities domicile, would have jurisdiction over all transactions in
the firm's securities.
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I. COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM: A MARKET APPROACH
TO SECURITIES REGULATION
Although both the states and the federal government regulate securities
transactions, the current regulatory arrangements are a far cry from competitive
federalism. The federal securities regime, consisting of the Securities Act of
193312 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 3 applies to all publicly
traded firms and is a mandatory system of disclosure regulation, bolstered by
antifraud provisions. While the federal laws do not preempt all state
regulation,14 states cannot lower the regulatory standards applicable to firms
covered by the federal regime because its requirements are mandatory. They
have also been prevented from raising regulatory standards on some
occasions.' 5 As a consequence, the states have essentially abandoned the
regulation of public firms to the SEC. In the proposed system of competitive
federalism, state and federal regulators would stand on an equal regulatory
footing, and firms would be able to choose the applicable regulatory regime.
A. The Essence of Competitive Federalism
A market approach to U.S. securities regulation requires two significant
departures from current law. First, a public corporation's coverage under the
national securities laws must be optional rather than mandatory. Second, the
securities transactions of a corporation that elects not to be covered by the
federal securities laws are to be regulated by the corporation's selected
domicile for securities regulation. This approach is premised on the idea that
competition among sovereigns-here the fifty states, the District of Columbia,
and the federal government (represented primarily by the SEC)-in the
production of securities laws would benefit investors in public corporations by
facilitating the adoption of regulation aligned with investors' preferences, as
has been true of the competitive production of corporation codes. The
motivation for the proposal is that no government entity can know better than
market participants what regulations are in their interest, particularly as firms'
requirements are continually changing with shifting financial market
conditions. Competing regulators would make fewer policy mistakes than a
12. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77a to -bbbb (West 1997).
13. Id. §§ 78a to -mm.
14. Although both statutes originally expressly reserved the rights of states to regulate secunties, the
1933 Act was amended in 1996 to preempt state regulation of the registration of publicly traded secunues.
See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-290. § 102. 110 Stat. 3416,
3417-20 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A § 77r).
15. See, e.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624. 640-46 (1982) (invalidating a state takeover
regulation that was more extensive than the federal regulation as a burden on interstate commerce). Only
a plurality of the Court in MITE held that the takeover statute was preempted by the federal act. See td.
at 634-40.
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monopolistic regulator as competition harnesses the incentives of the market
to regulatory institutions.
Regulatory competition is desirable because when the choice of
investments includes variation in legal regimes, promoters of firms will find
that they can obtain a lower cost of capital by choosing the regime that
investors prefer. For example, as long as investors are informed of the
governing legal regime, if promoters choose a regime that exculpates them
from fraud, investors will either not invest in the firm at all or will require a
higher return on the investment (that is, pay less for the security), just as
bondholders charge higher interest rates to firms bearing greater risk of
principal nonrepayment. 16 Investors set the price because financial capital is
highly mobile and financial markets are highly competitive; the set of
investment opportunities is extensive, and with the use of derivatives, virtually
limitless. It is plausible to assume that investors are informed about liability
rules given the sophistication of the institutional investors who comprise the
majority of stock market investors and whose actions determine market prices
on which uninformed investors can rely.17 Promoters thus will bear the cost
of operating under a legal regime inimical to investor interests, and they will
16. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE
LAW 17-21 (1991) (discussing how entrepreneurs choose terms that enhance investors' expected returns
in order to increase securities prices); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the
Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 275-76 (1977) (arguing that securities of firms
incorporated in states with codes unfavorable to shareholders will be unattractive investments).
17. In 1995, for example, institutional investors-pension funds, insurance companies, mutual funds,
and bank-managed investment funds-held 50% of total equity in the United States, including 57.2% of
the largest 1000 firms, see CAROLYN K. BRANCATO, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND CORPORAT
GOVERNANCE 19-20 (1997), compared to less than 10% of total equity in 1950, see NEW YORK STOCK
EXCH., FACT BOOK 1995 DATA 57 (1996), and 46.6% of the top 1000 firms in 1987, see BRANCATO,
supra, at 20. Although there are formal models of informationally inefficient capital markets (markets with,
for instance, speculative bubbles) that depend on the existence of irrational, uninformed traders termed
"noise traders," these models provide no theory that can predict when irrational pricing will occur and are
simply unrealistic with regard to market behavior. Namely, informed investors and arbitrageurs will trade
against the irrational individuals, preserving market efficiency, as the noise traders experience significant
losses and stop trading. For the development of this critique, see MILTON FRIEDMAN, The Case for Flexible
Exchange Rates, in ESSAYS IN POSITVE ECONOMICS 157 (1953); Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-
Market Prices, 38 J. Bus. 34, 37-39 (1965); and Paul A. Samuelson, The "Fallacy" of Maximizing the
Geometric Mean in Long Sequences of Investing or Gambling, 68 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 2493 (1971).
Modelers of inefficient markets have been unable to amend the models to respond to these criticisms. For
example, in models where noise traders affect price, they cannot be shown to survive over time (and thus
to affect prices in the long rn), see J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets,
98 J. POL. ECON. 703, 713, 717 (1990), but in the models in which noise traders can "survive" over time
(i.e., they *do not go bankrupt from their irrational trading), their misperceptions do not affect prices (i.e.,
the model is unsolvable if they are allowed to affect prices), see J. Bradford De Long et al., The Survival
of Noise Traders in Financial Markets, 64 J. BUS. 1, 2 (1991). In addition, more generalized versions of
models in which noise traders can affect prices have multiple equilibria, including the classical (efficient
pricing) equilibrium. In such models, the noisy (inefficient pricing) equilibria require very strong and
unrealistic assumptions concerning noise traders, such as their ability to hold infinite positions. See Ravi
Bhushan et al., Do Noise Traders "Create Their Own Space?", 32 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 25,
28 (1997). There is, however, one context in which unsophisticated investors are not protected by the
actions of institutional investors (that is, they cannot rely on prices set by informed investors): their
relations with brokers. This provides another reason for excluding the regulation of brokers from the
proposal. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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therefore select the regime that maximizes the joint welfare of promoters and
investors.
The analytical point concerning the ability of capital markets to assess
legal regimes and consequently the beneficial effect of competition is
confirmed by empirical research in the bond indenture and corporate law
contexts: Creditor protection provisions in bond indentures are positively
priced, 8 and firms experience statistically significant positive changes in
stock prices upon changing their incorporation state. 9 The entrepreneurial
motivation to reduce capital costs that operates in a competitive legal system
mitigates the otherwise core problem for a government regulator of identifying
what regulation will benefit investors in capital markets.
Federal intervention in capital markets in the 1930s was justified by a
contention that securities markets operate poorly on two dimensions: First, they
fail to protect investors from stock price manipulation and fraud; and second,
they produce an inadequate level of corporate disclosure because the benefits
of information concerning a firm cannot be appropriated solely by the firm that
bears the cost of the information's production (that is, corporate information
is a public good).20 Analytically, a demonstration that there are information
externalities necessitating government intervention depends on the mix of
informed and uninformed investors.2' But a theoretical need for government
regulation to prevent a market failure is not equivalent to a need for a
monopolist regulator. The premise of competitive federalism is that if, for
example, corporate information would be underproduced to investors'
18. See, e.g., Robert E. Chatfield & R. Charles Moyer. "'Putting'" Away Bond Risk." An Empincal
Examination of the Value of the Put Option on Bonds. FIN. MG, T.. Summer 1986. at 26. 31-32; Leland
Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses to Bondholders and *'Super Pouon Put" Bond Covenants. 46
J. FIN. 689, 690 (1991); Richard J. Kish & Miles Livingston, Estimating the Value of Call Options on
Corporate Bonds, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 1993. at 95. 97.
19. See Roberta Romano, Low as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporanon Puzzle. I J L ECON,
& ORG. 225, 271 (1985); Jianghong Wang, Performance of Reincorporated Firms 14-18. 21 (Nov. 17.
1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
20. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16. at 277 (explaining the antifraud rationale): Joel
Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System. 9 J. CORP. L I. 9 (1983)
(discussing the optimal disclosure level rationale). The economic theory underlying the argument concerning
information production is ambiguous, however:. Capital markets can overproduce information as well as
underproduce it. The informational efficiency of capital markets implies that only the first investor to obtain
private information about a firm is likely to realize the value of the information through trading, and this
creates an incentive for investors to engage in costly duplicative efforts at information production (that is.
overproduction) in a race to be first. See Jack Hirshlcifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and
the Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AK. ECON. REV. 561. 565-66 (1971). From this perspective, mandatory
disclosure could be beneficial by reducing the amount of privately produced information.
21. The formal models indicate that information will not be underproduced if the proportion of
investors who are informed (that is, capable of understanding the significance of nondisclosure) ts not too
low. See MICHAEL J. FISHMAN & KATHLEEN M. HAGERTY. MANDATORY VS. VOLUNTARY DISCLOSuRE
IN MARKETS WITH INFORMED AND UNINFORMED CUSTOMERS 17 (Department of Fin.. Kellogg Graduate
Sch. of Management, Northwestern Univ. Paper No. 233, 1997); Ronald A. Dye. Investor Sophistication
and Voluntary Disclosures 18 (1997) (unpublished manuscript. on file with the Yale Law Journal). As these
papers show, if all investors are informed, no information externality exists--investors draw negative
inferences from nondisclosure, forcing firms to reveal both good and bad information. See FISH.MAN &
HAGERTY, supra, at 1-2; Dye, supra, at I.
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detriment in an unregulated market, then there would be a demand for,
matched by a supply of, mandated disclosure regulation in a regime of state
competition for securities regulation, just as in the monopolist SEC system.
A third rationale more recently offered for federal intervention is a
refinement of the public good rationale. This rationale identifies the
information problem as involving information that would benefit an issuer's
competitors as well as investors. 22  According to this theory, because
competitors can use such information to compete more effectively with the
issuer and thereby diminish the issuer's profitability, investors as well as firms
would not wish to reveal such information, even though it would improve
investors' ability to evaluate firms. Such an externality would render
mandatory disclosure rules necessary. It can be shown analytically, however,
that even in the case of such third-party externalities, mandatory disclosure is
not always optimal compared to voluntary disclosure, and it would in all
likelihood be extremely difficult for a regulator to determine when mandatory
disclosure is optimal.23 But putting aside the theoretical uncertainty of the
need for a mandatory regime, even this third-party externality argument does
not require an exclusive federal regulator. The majority of investors hold
portfolios, not single shares of stock, and therefore, unlike the issuer, they will
internalize the externality if they make the disclosure decision. That is, they
will desire a regime requiring the information's disclosure because, by
definition of a positive externality, the expected gain on their shares in
competitors will offset the loss on their shares in the issuer.
Because the antifraud rationale does not depend on the presence of an
externality for government action, it presents even less of an objection to a
system of competitive federalism than the mandatory disclosure rationale: It
is silly to contend that investors will choose regimes that encourage fraud. Joel
Seligman states that a federal antifraud law was needed in the 1930s because
state securities laws did not reach out-of-state sellers. 2  Whatever the merit
of the argument at that time, it is not applicable to modern jurisdictional
doctrines and is therefore not relevant to today's policy discussions.'
22. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 290-91.
23. See Ronald A. Dye, Mandatory Versus Voluntary Disclosures: The Cases of Financial and Real
Externalities, 65 Accr. REv. 1, 15-16, 18-19 (1990) (providing a formal model indicating that divergence
between voluntary and mandatory disclosure depends on information-specifically, detailed a priori
knowledge of the covariances of firms' returns-that regulators are unlikely to obtain).
24. See Seligman, supra note 20, at 21.
25. Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel suggest an analogous reason for a federal law: the efficiency
of enforcing all claims involving a particular transaction in one case. See EASTERBROOK & FI5CHEL, supra
note 16, at 285. The choice-of-law reform discussed infra Part II, which adopts the issuer-based
jurisdictional approach of corporate law for state securities regulation, can resolve this concern: As is true
of shareholder class action claims for fiduciary breach, all securities claims can be consolidated into one
court action, with one law applying, that of the issuer's securities domicile. This reform also resolves
Easterbrook and Fischel's other explanation for why state competition would not work in the securities
context: The potential to exploit out-of-state shareholders with rules favoring in-state shareholders given
the multistate jurisdictional rules based on shareholder residence, see id. at 300-01, would disappear because
2368 [Vol. 107: 2359
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Moreover, if there was concern in the 1930s over the states' capacities to
handle securities fraud cases, this is no longer a serious issue. Given the
overlapping nature of the current antifraud regime, the states have developed
active securities law enforcement divisions and coordinating capacities to deal
with interstate fraud. 6
The federal securities regime regarding the regulation of securities markets
and market professionals who broker transactions between investors and issuers
is excluded from the proposed market approach.27 Brokers are excluded
because the domicile choices of their employing organizations are not subject
to the same capital market forces that prod regulatory competition to adopt
rules preferred by investors as are issuers. The owners of broker-dealers,
whose preferences would dictate the choice of securities regime, are not the
customers whose interests the securities regime seeks to protect2 Unless the
interests of broker-owners and custo-ners are identical on this dimension (that
is, share value is maximized under the securities regime customers prefer), the
owners may not choose the regime that customers desire.
Reputational concerns in the competition for customers surely affect
brokerage firms' incentives regarding the choice of regime. But reputation
provides lower-powered incentives here than in the case of issuers because
there are many potential conflicts of interest between broker-owners and
customers over the desirable rules. 29 This scenario is different from the choice
the reform would result in only one state's law governing all shareholders' transactions, regardless of the
shareholder's residence.
26. See, e.g., Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law. 62 U. CIN. IL REv. 471. 504-05 (1993).
A recent example illustrates the vigor of state enforcement activity. The New York state prosecutor's
criminal enforcement action against an insider trading on material information was undercut by the federal
government: The U.S. attorney seized the case and struck a plea bargain with the defendant after the state
prosecutor had developed the case and obtained an indictment. See Morgenthau v. White. N.Y. TimES. Dec.
6, 1997, at AIS. The states have also agreed to coordinate regulation of electronic offenngs on the Internet.
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation.
52 Bus. LAw. 1195, 1231-32 (1997). Indeed, the Internet is likely to facilitate state enforcement efforts,
as it has for the SEC, as state securities regulator websites will offer a ready means for communication of
complaints by nonresident investors. See Microcap Fraud, Staffing Issues Top Enforcement Agenda. 29 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1773 (Dec. 19, 1997) (reporting the statement of SEC Enforcement Division
Director William MeLucas that the Internet has made it easier for people to get in touch with the SEC
concerning complaints, as well as for the agency to "run down" people engaged in misconduct because
their electronic interactions with investors leave identifying trails).
27. Trading by such professionals that would fall under current antifraud provisions and is not related
to their relationship with a customer, such as trading on inside information in violation of section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994). see United States v. O'Hagan. 117 S. Ct. 2199
(1997), is included in the proposal (as is any such activity conducted by any non-issuer-affiliated third
party).
28. This is also true for investment advisers, who are regulated under the Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I to -18a.
29. Brokers that are also dealers have multiple revenue sources, which can create conflicts of interest
in trading policies. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 34-25,887. 41 SEC Dock. 473
(July 6, 1988) (finding a conflict between market-making activities and brokerage activities regarding
customer limit orders although dividing on the appropriate practice). After the E.F Hutton decision, the
NASD revised its rules to eliminate the conflict by according priority to customer limit orders, which was
subsequently approved by the SEC. See Exchange Act Release No. 34.279, 59 Fed. Reg. 34.883 (1994)
(approving the rule). In addition, although competition should restrain the conflict between brokerage firms
The Yale Law Journal
of securities regime by the owners of issuers, because the issuer-related
provisions of the securities laws concern precisely the relation between issuers
and owners. A further consequence of this distinction between the regulation
of issuers and brokers is that brokerage customers who are not informed of the
relevant securities regime may not be protected by the presence of informed
investors in the market. In contrast, uninformed stockholders benefit from
informed investors' evaluation of issuers as it is revealed in stock prices.
There is one change that must be made in the regulation of market
professionals, however, to maintain the integrity of the market approach to
securities regulation for issuers. In order to prevent the SEC from being able
surreptitiously to regulate issuers not subject to its jurisdiction, the small subset
of SEC regulations that relate market professionals' conduct to substantive
SEC regulation of issuers, such as the requirement that brokers and dealers
obtain issuers' periodic SEC filings before providing quotations, 30 will have
to be modified to refer to the substantive law of the issuer's domicile. Such a
reform would not undermine the SEC's responsibility to oversee market
professionals. Given that none of the SEC's substantive issuer disclosure
requirements are drafted with its market professional oversight responsibilities
in view, where states require a different or reduced set of issuer disclosures
than the SEC, such information would also be adequate for the SEC's
oversight purposes, as competition would produce the level of issuer disclosure
deemed cost-effective by investors.
Whether exchanges should be included in the proposed regulatory reform
is more complicated. Exchanges are also not investor-owned corporations; they
are not-for-profit organizations controlled by member trading firms. They are,
however, exposed to incentive-aligning market forces. Competition for trading
across exchanges tends to align exchange members' regulatory choices with
investors' preferences, to the extent that trading volume is maximized under
trading rules preferred by investors. If there is a conflict between rules
maximizing trading volume and investor welfare, the market will not provide
exchanges with high-powered incentives.
There is disagreement in the literature over whether there is a conflict
between increased trading volume and the trading rules preferred by
investors, 31 but the severity of any such conflict is likely to be small and
controllable. For example, Yakov Amihud and Haim Mendelson, who believe
and customers over trading costs, the securities industry recently reached a substantial settlement in
litigation charging dealer collusion over bid-ask spreads in the over-the-counter market. See Patrick
McGeehan, Settlement of Nasdaq Suit To Hit Some Firms Harder, WALL ST. J., Dec. 24, 1997, at ClI.
30. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1997).
31. Compare Yakov Amihud & Haim Mendelson, A New Approach to the Regulation of Trading
Across Securities Markets, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1411, 1434-42 (1996) (emphasizing the conflict between
exchange and investor preferences), with Daniel R. Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of
Dual Class Common Stock, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 119, 123-25 (1987) (emphasizing the compatibility of
exchange and investor preferences).
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there is a conflict, contend that if issuers, rather than exchanges, controlled the
listing decision, the incentive problem regarding exchanges' choice of trading
rules would be eliminated.32
There is, moreover, a further, pragmatic reason to exclude exchanges from
the proposal that is independent of the debate over exchanges' incentives: to
target the proposal where it will do the most good. In contrast to corporate
issuers, exchanges are self-regulating under the federal securities scheme.
Rather than specify regulatory requirements for exchanges and their members,
federal law delegates regulatory authority to the exchanges themselves, subject
to oversight by the SEC. The benefits from regulatory competition would thus
be far more attenuated for exchanges than for issuers." Even more important
than in the context of market professionals, there is a critical change that must
be made to the existing regulatory regime for exchanges to integrate
successfully the exchanges' continued oversight by the SEC with a competitive
regime for issuers. The SEC's authority over exchanges must be statutorily
limited to non-issuer-related matters, such as trading rules. Otherwise, the
agency would be able to undermine the market approach by introducing
mandatory rules for issuers in the form of exchange requirements that preempt
competing state regimes.
Finally, mutual funds, which are regulated by the SEC under the
Investment Company Act of 1940, a regime that entails far more than
disclosure requirements, present a more complicated regulatory context. Some
funds could easily come under the proposal-the mutual funds that are subject
to the same investor-driven market forces as corporate issuers because their
owners are their customers, the objects of securities regulation. There is,
however, a potentially important difference between these funds and issuers:
The most informed investors in the stock market, large institutions, hold
securities directly and typically do not invest in mutual funds that are held by
individual investors. Thus, for competitive federalism to work for mutual fund
registration, there must be a sufficient number of individual investors in mutual
fund shares who are informed about the legal regimes governing their shares
such that their regulatory preferences will govern fund domicile outcomes.
Under such circumstances-a set of informed fund investors-the overall
32. See Amihud & Mendelson. supra note 31, at 1442-46.
33. This is not to say that the SEC's oversight of exchange rules has unambiguously benefited
investors. It has not. For example, the SEC supported the anticompetitive fixed commission rule of the New
York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for many years, see SUSAN M. PtIIWPs & J. RiCHARD ZECIIER. DilE SEC
AND THE PUBLIC INT'EREST 53-89 (1981). and the benefit to investors from the SEC's commitment to
developing multiple markets in NYSE stocks has been questioned. see Amihud & Mendelson. supra note
31, at 1454. Rather, it is simply to acknowledge that there is a need for pnonties and that the SEC's
exclusive jurisdiction over issuers is a source of greater harm to investors than is its osersight of exchange
rules because, in contrast to its policies toward issuers, the SEC has not successfully imposed uniformity
on all exchange rules and practices. See. e.g.. Macey. supra note 8. at 937-38 (discussing the SEC's failed
effort through Rule 19c-4 to impose a one-share one-vote requirement on all exchanges)
34. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-I to -64 (1994).
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mechanics of competitive federalism for investment companies would follow
the mechanics for issuers.
Many funds are not, however, customer-owned. For these funds, potential
incentive-alignment concerns regarding owner and customer interests would be
present, as they are in the broker and exchange contexts. The competitiveness
of the mutual fund industry suggests that funds would have incentives to
ensure that investors are informed about the benefits of their domiciles, as
compared to those of competitors, just as funds advertise their rates today.
Moreover, the fast-developing access to information concerning securities
regulation on the Internet suggests that the probability that competition would
work in this context is quite high. 5 But given the absence of research that
pertains to this issue, the alignment of regime choice across fund owners and
customers is not assured. Accordingly, this Article does not provide a detailed
proposal to implement a market approach to mutual fund regulation.
B. Is Abandoning a Mandatory Federal Securities Law Justified?
This section first reviews the empirical literature that has sought to
measure the impact of the federal securities regime on investors. The analysis
rests on contemporary empirical studies because the historical "evidence" of
market abuses whose revelation congressional investigators orchestrated during
the hearings preceding the creation of the federal regime as part of the New
Deal agenda has been shown to be inaccurate." The hearings were held for
the purpose of furthering a political end (federal regulation of the stock
market), and the statistical techniques used by modem researchers were not
available to researchers in the 1930s to develop the case for or against
regulation. Even today, little empirical evidence suggests that the federal
regime has affirmatively benefited investors. To develop an educated prediction
of what the counterfactual (a competitive securities regime) would produce,
this section then reviews the empirical evidence on investor welfare of the next
best thing-state competition for corporate charters. It compares favorably.
The difficulty of discerning an affirmative impact on investors from the
federal regime detailed in this section supports abandoning its exclusivity.
While it does not prove the counterfactual-that state competition would be
better-the near total absence of measurable benefits from the federal
regulatory apparatus surely undermines blind adherence to the status quo.
Under regulatory competition, lawmakers have incentives to replace regimes
35. See, e.g., Technology Issues Priorities for SEC in '98, Barbash States, 29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep.
(BNA) 1720 (Dec. 12, 1997) (summarizing the SEC Division of Investment Management Director's
prediction that Web sites containing major securities laws from regulators around the world will be
available to investors by the end of 1998).
36. See HAROLD BIERMAN, JR., THE GREAT MYTHs OF 1929 AND THE LESSONS To BE LEARNED 133-
46 (1991); see also infra text accompanying notes 72-74.
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that do not measurably support their objectives with those that do. In a
competitive regulatory system, undesirable mandatory policies cannot be
maintained over time, because they are not enforceable: Firms will migrate to
the regulatory regime that does not impose such mandates.
The competitively produced state corporation codes, in contrast to the
federal securities laws, consist primarily of enabling provisions that reduce the
cost of business by providing firms and investors with a standardized
contractual form to govern their relationships. Thus, to the extent the empirical
literature suggests that federal securities laws have been fashioned from a set
of misguided premises, adoption of the market approach to securities regulation
will weed out inefficiencies in the federal regime, by permitting capital market
participants to establish a new regulatory equilibrium with a mix of enabling
and mandatory provisions, if that is what investors prefer.
1. Empirical Evidence on the Rationales for Federal Securities
Regulation
a. Mandatory Disclosure
There is little tangible proof of the claim that corporate information is
"underproduced" in the absence of mandatory disclosure, or that the benefits
to investors from information that firms would not produce in the absence of
mandatory disclosure actually outweigh their costs. For instance, before the
enactment of the federal securities laws in the 1930s, public corporations
voluntarily disclosed financial statements, typically under a stock exchange
listing requirement, that contained substantially all of the information
subsequently required under the federal laws. In an important and still
underappreciated study, George Benston found that the only major mandated
item that was not reported by a significant set of firms prior to the 1934
legislation was sales. Comparing the pre- and post-legislation stock returns of
the firms for which the legislation was relevant (firms that had not previously
reported their sales, which were 38% of New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)-
listed corporations) with those for which it was not (the remaining 62% of
NYSE corporations that had disclosed sales information), he found no
significant price effect from the new mandated disclosure.37
37. See George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REv. 132, 144-45 (1973) (hereinafter Benston, Evaluation]. see also
George Benston, An Appraisal of the Costs and Benefits of Government-Required Disclosure: SEC and FTC
Requirements, LAW & CONrEMP. PROBS.. Summer 1977. at 30. 51-52 [hereinafter Benston. Appraisal]. Joel
Seligman criticizes the significance of this finding, see Seligman. supra note 20. at 16-17. but his
objections, which follow those of Irwin Friend and Randolph Westerfield. see Irwin Friend & Randolph
Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: Comment. 65 AM. ECON. REV 467 (1975), actually
reinforce Benston's conclusions. For example, in criticism of Benston's finding of no stock price effect of
the SEC's disclosure requirements, Seligman cites more recent studies showing that the data in SEC filings
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Benston's finding, upon reflection, should not be surprising: Because firms
need capital and investors need information, firms have powerful incentives to
disclose information if they are to compete successfully for funds against
alternative investment opportunities. Consistent with this explanation, studies
have found that the quantity and quality of publicly traded firms' voluntary
disclosures (such as earnings forecasts) are positively correlated with the
issuance of securities 38 and with information asymmetry in the market for the
firm's stock (that is, managers release information voluntarily when there is
greater information asymmetry, as measured by the stock price's bid-ask
spread), 39 and negatively related to the cost of capital (that is, increased
voluntary disclosure reduces firms' cost of capital).4" In addition, European
firms listing in London typically comply with the higher United Kingdom
disclosure requirements rather than with the lower ones of their home
countries, although they need not comply with U.K. rules under the European
Community disclosure directives.4 ' A further datum relevant to the issue of
affect stock prices in an effort to prove that the SEC's mandated disclosure program is of value to
investors. See Seligman, supra note 20, at 16. But it is not the SEC's disclosure requirements that are
affecting stock value in these studies, because they have not added any new items into the information mix
already disclosed: The information examined in the studies Seligman cites, earnings, was disclosed, as
Benston demonstrates, even prior to the creation of the SEC and would continue to be disclosed if there
were no SEC. See Benston, Evaluation, supra, at 135-36. Seligman acknowledges this point by adding that
the issue is whether the SEC compels information that otherwise would not have been voluntarily disclosed,
rather than where the item is disclosed (SEC report or otherwise). See Seligman, supra note 20, at 16. But
the studies he cites, see id. at 16 n.48, do not bear upon this issue. Seligman also objects to Benston's test
because it did not adequately distinguish between disclosure and nondisclosure firms, as all the firms in
his sample disclosed earnings. But this is precisely Benston's point: The SEC's mandated disclosure added
only one item-sales--that had not been disclosed by NYSE firms, and release of the new information
under its requirement had no effect on the stock prices of those firms that previously had not been
disclosing sales. See Benston, Evaluation, supra, at 141-42.
38. See, e.g., Richard Frankel et al., Discretionary Disclosure and External Financing, 70 ACCT. REV.
135, 141 (1995) (finding that firms are significantly more likely to forecast earnings if they access capital
markets over the sample period); Mark Lang & Russell Lundholm, Cross-Sectional Determinants of Analyst
Ratings of Corporate Disclosures, 31 J. Acer. RES. 246, 265-69 (1993) (finding that a firm's Financial
Analyst Federation disclosure quality rating increases with security issuance); William Ruland et al.,
Factors Associated with the Disclosure of Managers' Forecasts, 65 Acr. REV. 710, 720 (1990) (finding
that firms reporting forecasts are more likely to issue new capital); cf. Frederick D.S. Choi, Financial
Disclosure and Entry to the European Capital Market, II J. ACc. RES. 159, 168-70 (1973) (finding that
firms entering the Eurobond market increase disclosure).
39. See CAROL A. MARQUARDT & CHRISTINE I. WIEDMAN, VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE, INFORMATION
ASYMMETRY, AND INSIDER SELLING THROUGH SECONDARY EQUITY OFFERINGS 16, 19-20, 22 (John M.
Olin School of Business, Washington Univ. Working Paper No. 97-05, 1997) (finding that, in secondary
offerings, managers act as if reduced information asymmetry is correlated with reduced cost of capital, such
that their participation in an offering explains the frequency of voluntary disclosure); Maribeth Coller &
Teri Lombardi Yohn, Management Forecasts and Information Asymmetry: An Examination of Bid-Ask
Spreads, 35 J. Acer. RES. 181 (1997) (finding that firms with increasing bid-ask spreads release forecasts
to reduce spread).
40. See Christine A. Botosan, Disclosure Level and the Cost of Equity Capital, 72 AcCT. REV. 323,
344, 346 (1997) (showing that voluntary disclosure in the annual report significantly explains the cost of
capital of firms with small analyst followings).
41. See HAL S. SCOTT & PHILIP A. WELLONS, INTERNATIONAL FINANCE: TRANSACTIONS, POLICY,
AND REGULATION 314 (3d ed. 1996) (citing references concerning Danish and French firms' compliance
with United Kingdom standards); G.K. Meek & S.J. Gray, Globalization of Stock Markets and Foreign
Listing Requirements: Voluntary Disclosures by Continental European Companies Listed on the London
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information production is the fact that European stock markets are no less
efficient than U.S. stock markets even though the European accounting and
disclosure regimes require the revelation of considerably less information than
does the SEC.42
There is, accordingly, ample evidence that firms voluntarily disclose
significant amounts of information beyond that mandated by securities
regulators. It is difficult to prove what, if any item, among required disclosures
is of less value to investors than items voluntarily disclosed, but the great
variety in content across disclosure regimes-a recent study identified one
hundred SEC disclosure items deemed excessive compared to international
standards4 3 -suggests that a number of mandates are not cost effective.
Although the estimates are extremely crude and conservative, Susan M.
Phillips and J. Richard Zecher calculated in 1975 that the termination of the
SEC's mandatory periodic disclosure programs would reduce corporate
disclosure costs by at least $213 million." These data make it plain that
regulators do not have superior knowledge concerning what information
investors need (otherwise firms would not on occasion disclose more than
required), which bolsters the desirability of regulatory competition, as it will
reduce regulatory mistakes.
In a detailed defense of federal legislation, Seligman challenges Benston's
findings with data compiled by the SEC during the 1940s and 1950s in order
to expand its jurisdiction, data which indicate that small firms not subject to
the federal securities laws disclosed less information than the SEC required of
its larger-sized registrants. In particular, Seligman notes that the SEC
reported that most of the small firms did not disclose management
compensation or insider transactions in proxy statements and that some firms
did not furnish income statements or provided inadequate accounting
information, compared to SEC requirements, in their balance sheets."6 But
these data do not provide proof of the efficacy of the federal securities regime.
The failure to provide voluntarily the information that the SEC mandates does
Stock Exchange, 20 J. INT'L Bus. STUD. 315 (1989) (reviewing a sample of European companies trading
in London).
42. See GABRIEL HAWAWINI, EUROPEAN EQUITY MARKETS. PRICE, BEHAVIOR AND FrncIFE.T-cY
(1984); William J. Baumol & Burton G. Malkiel, Redundant Regulation of Foreign Securin Trading and
U.S. Competitiveness, in MODERNIZING U.S. SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 7, at 39, 46-50. Edwards.
supra note 7, at 64-66.
43. See Frederick D.S. Choi, Financial Reporting RequirementsforNon-U S Registrants International
Market Perspectives, 6 FIN. MARKETS INSTITSrrONS & INTRUMLTS 23. 29 (1997) Ther arc also
significant differences in the securities disclosure regimes of emerging markets, where we might expect a
need for substantial disclosure to encourage foreign investment. See Shahrokh M Saudagaran & Joselto
G. Diga, Financial Reporting in Emerging Capital Markets: Characterstics and Polc 1ujues. ACCT
HORIZONS, June 1997, at 41.
44. See PHILLIPS & ZECHER, supra note 33. at 49-51. Their estimate of the extra costs Imposed in the
1975 new issue market was Sl93 million. See id. at 51
45. See Seligman, supra note 20, at 36-39.
46. See id. at 36.
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not demonstrate that such disclosure enhances investor welfare. It does so only
with an additional assumption-that the SEC, and not the firms, has made the
correct cost-benefit calculation.
To address the issue of the adequacy of the differential level of disclosure
by nonregistrants, we need to know the answers to the following questions:
Were financial analysts and shareholders unable to value firms accurately
under the more limited voluntary disclosures? If so, did they underpay or
overpay for the shares (that is, did promoters and insiders bear the cost of the
allegedly inadequate disclosure, or did the outside investors)? It would be
difficult to make such judgments directly, although a finding of significant
changes in stock prices upon firms' increased disclosures under SEC
requirements would be probative on the issue.
There is no study of which I am aware that examines the effect of the
1965 extension of the continuing disclosure requirements to small firms. But
there was no significant increase in stock prices after enactment of the 1933
Act for new issue registration,47 a finding that strongly suggests that the new
federal regime had, at best, no effect on investor welfare. If the 1933 Act did
not increase stock prices of covered firms, it is unlikely that the 1965
47. See George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of Securities Markets, 37 J. Bus. 117, 120-21 (1964)
(finding that SEC registration requirements had no effect on returns); see also Gregg A. Jarrell, The
Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the Market for New Securities Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613, 645,
666 (1981) (reaching the same conclusion by examining returns over five years from issuance); Carol J.
Simon, The Effect of the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues,
79 AM. ECON. REv. 295, 305 (1989) (finding no effect on returns of NYSE and seasoned regional exchange
issues). Simon did find that one subsample of firms, unseasoned issues traded on regional exchanges, had
greater returns after the enactment of the Act (they were overpriced before the Act), see Simon, supra, at
305-06, but this subsample performed significantly worse in all periods than the other new issues in the
study, see id. at 308. Irwin Friend and Edward S. Herman, in a study on which Seligman relies heavily,
criticized Stigler's interpretation of his data because, although not statistically significant, post-Act issues
had higher returns than pre-Act issues, and because there was a significant positive return after four years.
See Irwin Friend & Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. Bus. 382, 391 (1964).
These criticisms do not, however, impeach Stigler's findings. The length of the interval over which they
find a stock price effect-four years-is so long that it is impossible to attribute the price change to the
legislation. Friend and Herman also do not provide a theory explaining why the 1933 Act should improve
a new issue's returns only four years after its issuance. Not only is such a result inconsistent with a
relatively efficient stock market, but we would also expect mandated disclosure to have the greatest impact
over the shorter interval of Stigler's study, as short-term performance would be more predictable than long-
term performance from financial disclosures. Nor do Friend and Herman explain why statistically
insignificant findings should be given any evidentiary weight, counter to conventional social scientific
practice. Further damaging to Friend and Herman's critique is the confirmation of Stigler's basic results
by the more recent studies of Jarrell and Simon. A study of existing stocks, rather than new issues, finds
that the 1933 Act had a negative price impact, which the author attributes to the Act's restrictions on
accounting procedures, which may have adversely affected the firms' ability to comply with debt covenants
that were based on accounting numbers. See Chee W. Chow, The Impacts of Accounting Regulation on
Bondholder and Shareholder Wealth: The Case of the Securities Acts, 58 Acr. REv. 485, 489, 502, 507
(1983). Chow expected to find a wealth transfer from shareholders to bondholders given the accounting
covenants hypothesis, but he was unable to identify such an effect. Because the sample stocks were not new
issues (to which the 1933 Act applied), it is difficult to interpret the study's results without knowing
whether these firms planned to issue new securities in the future. A further difference, which is a serious
shortcoming, between this study and the others is that, in contrast to the other studies, it did not adjust
stock returns for market movements, which may account for the results. See id. at 503.
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extension of the Act did so, for the absence of a price increase after 1933
suggests that the market elicited the right level of disclosure. A similar
conclusion can be drawn from studies of a more specific instance of SEC-
mandated disclosure-the requirement that large corporations disclose the
current replacement cost of inventories, plant, and equipment. Researchers
found no stock price effect when firms disclosed the newly mandated
replacement cost information, suggesting that investors did not find the SEC's
mandated disclosure useful for valuing firms.4
The variance of stock returns, however, decreased after the enactment of
the 1933 Act.49 A plausible interpretation is that the legislation simply forced
riskier investments off the market. 50 Consistent with this explanation, after the
1933 Act there was a decrease in the proportion of outstanding new issues of
common stock compared to debt, and there was a dramatic increase in private
placements of debt concentrated among bonds of higher risk.5' Such a
result-reduction in the investment opportunity set--does not obviously benefit
investors, who merely require higher compensation for riskier securities, while
in all likelihood it reduces social welfare by restricting the availability of
financing for the riskiest ventures.
The finding of a decrease in return variance has also been interpreted as
indicating that the disclosure mandated by the Act enabled investors to form
more accurate price predictions.52 Even this alternative explanation does not,
however, demonstrate that the Act benefited investors. A core tenet of modern
finance theory is that investors are compensated for bearing market risk, and
it was firm-specific risk and not market risk that was measured to have
decreased with the 1933 Act. In this regard, it is not surprising that there is no
stock price effect: A reduction in own-return variance (that is, more accurate
stock prices) is of no value to diversified investors. Consequently,
commentators who point to the return variance reduction as evidence affirming
the efficacy of the 1933 Act are mistaken; investors benefit only from
reductions in risk that is priced.
Seligman provides a further datum in support of the contention that the
SEC's mandatory disclosure program benefits investors: From 1955 to 1971,
"approximately two percent of the registration statements filed with the SEC
were withdrawn after receipt of an SEC letter of comment [seeking additional
48. See Ross L. WARTs & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSmVE AccOUNr NG THEORY 174 & n.9 (1986)
(citing studies).
49. See Jarrell, supra note 47, at 646; Simon. supra note 47. at 309; Sugler. supra note 47. at 122.
50. See Jarrell, supra note 47, at 648-49, 668; Stigler supra note 47, at 122. Seha Tinic offers a
further gloss on this explanation, finding that the kind of securities that underwriters were willing to offer
changed to larger, less risky issues after enactment of the 1933 Act because the underwriters were fearful
of their legal liability under the Act. See Seha M. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Pubihc Offerings of Common
Stock, 43 J. FIN. 789, 813 (1988).
51. See Jarrell, supra note 47, at 661, 664. 667. 669.
52. See Seligman, supra note 20, at 10; Simon. supra note 47. at 313.
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disclosures] or ... [an SEC] stop order., 53 This datum does not, however,
indicate that the SEC's program aided investors. The key datum, which is not
knowable, is whether, had those withdrawn issues been marketed as planned,
investors would have overpaid for the issue or otherwise been defrauded
concerning the firms' value. Emphasis on registration withdrawal data
presupposes gross investor stupidity by assuming that an investor reading a
prospectus that SEC staff thought deficient would not similarly recognize the
deficiency and discount the share price. Why assume that the analytical ability
of the SEC staff is superior to that of financial analysts or investors? Such an
assumption simply does not square with what we know.
One reason for the surreal character of the arguments based on historical
data that are raised in support of the federal regime is that capital markets have
changed dramatically since the securities laws were adopted. The institutional
investors who dominate today's markets have far greater ability, as well as
financial incentives, to process information and price securities than does the
SEC staff.54 Institutional investors' pricing determinations better protect
unsophisticated investors than any of the SEC's mandated disclosure
requirements because, given the efficiency of U.S. capital markets in
information aggregation, and the fact that securities sell for one price,
institutional investors cannot use their superior information-processing ability
to extract wealth systematically from uninformed investors, particularly those
long-term investors who follow a buy-and-hold strategy.5 5 The federal regime
has not adapted well to this changed context. The interests of sophisticated and
unsophisticated investors in the choice of securities regime will not diverge for
the issuer-investor relations that come under the regime of competitive
federalism proposed by this Article, and will, in fact, be better served by the
new regulatory arrangement.
One particularly egregious example of the SEC's problematic disclosure
policies will serve to underscore the point that it would be a profound mistake
to presume that the SEC gets things right. The SEC prohibited for decades the
disclosure of projected earnings. Such information, however, is far more
valuable to investors than the accounting information the SEC required,
53. Seligman, supra note 20, at 43.
54. This discrepancy in expertise is evident in recent rulemaking activity by the SEC. By abandoning
its usual approach of standardized disclosure requirements in its new rule requiring disclosure of the market
risk of derivative securities, the SEC implicitly acknowledged that it is, and will always be, woefully behind
market participants in understanding and developing the most accurate valuation techniques for these
complex instruments. See Disclosure of Accounting Policies for Derivative Financial Instruments and
Derivative Commodity Instruments and Disclosure of Quantitative and Qualitative Information About
Market Risk Inherent in Derivative Financial Instruments, Other Financial Instruments, and Derivative
Commodity Instruments, Exchange Act Release No. 33-7386, 62 Fed. Reg. 6044, 6048 n.45, 6057 (1997)
(to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 239, 240, 249) [hereinafter SEC Derivatives Disclosure]
(explaining why the rule permits choice of quantitative disclosure methods, including model parameters).
55. For a recent review of the research on market efficiency, see Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital
Markets: II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1600-02 (1991).
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because stock value is a function of future cash flows not historical data.5
The SEC modified its position in 1979 to permit the disclosure of projections
within a safe harbor rule,57 but even today the agency's approach is still quite
guarded when it comes to such disclosures. For instance, when Congress
recently legislated a safe harbor from civil liability for forecasts, the SEC was
responsible for the extended list of transactions excluded from the safe harbor
provision. 8
The SEC's historic concern was that projections were more susceptible to
abuse than accounting data. This concern was premised on a bizarre view of
investor decisionmaking, that investors believe all figures are "written on
stone" and do not discount managers' optimism and therefore have to be
protected from all but "verifiable" information (namely, historical cost).59
This approach has made SEC disclosure documents of limited value for
investment decisionmaking and was the subject of sustained criticisms
throughout the 1970s. Ironically, the SEC's approach particularly
disadvantaged public investors by closing off their ability to obtain information
on projected earnings, as firms would not make public earnings forecasts for
fear of liability, although they would provide them to analysts and other
professionals. 6°
The 1979 modification did not substantially increase public forecasts, given
firms' liability concerns, 61 and was clearly outmoded for modem markets
populated by institutional investors. Congress therefore sought to increase the
disclosure of forecasts in the 1995 securities reform legislation by explicitly
creating a safe harbor from civil liability for the release of forecasts. 6"
Whether the legislation will have the intended effect is not yet ascertainable,
but some early indications suggest that the new law is having minimal impact
on the disclosure of projections. 63 The restrictions on the applicability of the
56. See, e.g., Homer Kripke, Can the SEC Make Disclosure Polic Meaningful
7
.J PoRTFOulO MG.%rr.
Summer 1976, at 32, 35-37.
57. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (1997). originally promulgated in Safe Harbor Rule for Projections.
Exchange Act Release No. 33-6084 (June 25, 1979). available in 1979 WL 16388; 17 C FR § 230.175
(1997).
58. See, e.g., Noelle Matteson. Comment. Private Securities Ligation Reform Act of 1995: Do Issuers
Still Get Soaked in the Safe Harbor?, 27 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 527. 548 n.139 (1997) (citing sources
indicating that the SEC supported the provision only after Congress agreed to the SEC's proposed
transaction exclusions).
59. Kripke, supra note 56, at 40.
60. See Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Mythls and Some Realities. 45 N.Y.U L. REV.
1151, 1199 (1970).
61. See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Exchange Act Release No 33-7101. 59 Fed.
Reg. 52,723, 52,728-29 (Oct. 19. 1994). available in 1994 WL 562021. at "7-8
62. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Pub. L No. 104.67. § 102. 109 Stat. 737.
749-56 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (West 1997))
63. See, e.g., Panelists Dispute Reform Law's Impact on Private Class Securities Fraud itigation.
29 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1134 (Aug. 15. 1997); Matteson. supra note 58. at 550-51 A recent study.
however, finds that forecasts by a sample of high technology firms increased after the Act. See Marilyn
Johnson et al., The Impact of Securities Litigation Reform on the Disclosure of Forward-Looking
Information by High Technology Firms (Jan. 2, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law
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safe harbor so vigorously advanced by the SEC surely enhance the likelihood
that the statute's impact will be limited, and they serve as a useful reminder
of how difficult it is for a monopolist government agency to alter course and
implement significant policy changes.
This illustration of utterly misguided SEC disclosure mandates makes plain
that an SEC disclosure initiative does not itself provide evidence that the
market is inadequately producing relevant information and, consequently,
should not be privileged by assuming that the agency is always (or even more
often than not) right. It indicates quite the opposite, that the SEC may not
possess even a rudimentary understanding of, much less a superior capacity
over anyone else to identify, what information investors require for
decisionmaking. Such regulatory mistakes would be far less likely with
competition: Investors would be able to reveal their preference for particular
information by bidding up the price of firms subject to a regime in which they
could make forecasts, compared to firms subject to one that prohibits such
disclosures.
b. Mandatory Disclosure Involving Third-Party Externalities
Proponents of the third-party externality rationale have not specified what
information requirements the rationale justifies, let alone whether that
information is the focus of SEC disclosure requirements. In fact, such
information is at times explicitly excluded from the SEC's mandated
disclosure.64 It is thus difficult to use empirical studies of SEC mandates as
tools for investigating this rationale compared to the more general information
underproduction rationale. One area that might be seen as an instance of
mandated disclosure designed to assist third parties is the segment or line-of-
business financial reporting requirements promulgated by the SEC in 1969.65
These requirements mandated separate disclosure of both profits and revenues
of firms' different business product lines. Such disclosure could enable rival
firms to discern more precisely firms' costs, facilitating competitive strategies.
The results of studies investigating whether the additional information
disclosed under the segment-reporting requirements benefited investors
essentially duplicate the results of the studies of the 1933 Act. They report no
significant change in stock price and an increased consensus among financial
statement users concerning predicted earnings, but are in disagreement over
Journal).
64. See, e.g., Regulation S-K, Item 101, 17 C.F.R. § 229.101(c)(ii) (1997) (providing that an issuer
is not required to disclose narrative information concerning new business lines and products "the disclosure
of which would affect adversely the registrant's competitive position").
65. See Adoption of Amendments to Forms S-1, S-7 and 10, Exchange Act Release No. 4988 (July
14, 1969), available in 1969 S.E.C. LEXIS 709.
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whether there was a significant change in firms' market risk from the increased
disclosure. 66
The absence of any consistent discernible effect on firm value of the line-
of-business disclosures is consistent with Edmund Kitch's contention that the
SEC's segment-reporting requirements do not lead to disclosure of information
of competitive value because of the discretion necessarily afforded
management, under the disclosure rules, in the allocation of costs and grouping
of activities.67 If Kitch's analysis is correct and proprietary information is not
effectively disclosed by line-of-business reporting, then it is not an example of
a disclosure mandate that mitigates third-party externalities. Kitch further
contends that it is virtually impossible in practice to implement a disclosure
regime that includes proprietary information--either firms will not
meaningfully disclose information that can benefit their competitors, or they
will delist to avoid such disclosure." This contention, supported by the
empirical research on segment reporting, highlights an essential weakness of
the third-party externality rationale for the federal regime of mandatory
disclosure: A theory that cannot be implemented effectively cannot serve as the
basis for public policy.
c. Antifraud Provisions
The federal antifraud laws have not been a focus of as much empirical
research as the federal disclosure regime.69 But even here there is little
evidence indicating that federal, as opposed to state, securities laws are
necessary to protect investors from fraud and manipulation. In truth, the data
that would be probative of the efficacy of the federal antifraud regime have not
66. See, e.g., Bipin B. Ajinkya. An Empirical Evaluation of Lne-of-Bustnes Reporting. 18 J ACCr
RES. 343, 357-59 (1980) (reporting no effect on returns and increased conscnsus in probability
assessments); Daniel W. Collins & Richard R. Simonds. SEC Line-of-Business Disclosure and Market Risk
Adjustments, 17 J. Acr. REs. 352, 372-73. 378-80 (1979) (noting change in market risk); Bertrand
Horwitz & Richard Kolodny, Line of Business Reporting and Security Prices: An Analysis of an SEC
Disclosure Rule, 8 BELL J. ECON. 234, 239, 241-42, 246 (1977) (reporting no effect on market risk or on
returns). See generally Rosanne M. Mohr, The Segmental Reporting Issue: A Review of Empirical Research,
2 J. ACer. LITERATURE 39, 45-52, 56-62 (1983) (reviewing the literature and concluding that there was
no effect on returns, some improvement in analyst forecasts, increased consensus, and mixed evidence
concerning whether market risk shifted).
67. See Edmund v. Kitch, The Theory and Practice ofSecurties Disclosure. 61 BROOK. L REv 763.
858 (1995).
68. See id. at 874.
69. If disclosure reduces the frequency of fraud and fraudulent issues arc generally of high risk. then
one explanation of the finding that the 1933 Act reduced the variance of stock returns could be that the
1933 Act eliminated fraudulent issues. See Jarrell. supra note 47, at 649. Jarrell sought to test this
hypothesis by examining the performance of pre-SEC new issues but excluding from the pre-1934 sample
the firms that would have been screened out by the SEC's regulation (the riskiest issues) had the Act been
in effect in the earlier years. See id. at 650. He found that the screened sample performed no better than
the entire pre-SEC sample. See id. Jarrell concludes that the reduction in variance after the Act is not due
to effective deterrence of fraud, because high variance is not connected to poor performance in the
unregulated period. See id.
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been compiled. Because all states had antifraud statutes prior to the adoption
of the federal securities laws, and only Nevada did not have an administrative
entity to investigate securities fraud at that time,70 an investigation of whether
reported instances of investor fraud decreased after the enactment of federal
securities laws would be a useful step in determining the efficacy of the federal
regime. The difficulty, however, of establishing a preenactment baseline rate
(given differences in enforcement regimes across states, for example), probably
would make the task infeasible. Other probative research would examine
whether securities issued outside of the SEC's jurisdiction (intrastate issues of
small firms, state and local government securities, or foreign issues) have
higher frequencies of fraud and price manipulation than SEC-registered
securities, although, again, developing good estimates of comparative base-rate
frequencies would be quite difficult.
Seligman cites SEC testimony to Congress in the 1940s and a 1963 SEC
study as part of the agency's twenty-year effort to expand its jurisdiction over
small firms, indicating that the SEC initiated more fraud investigations against
issues exempt from federal registration requirements than against those that
were registered.7 These data are of little import. First, we do not know
whether the SEC allocated more resources to investigating exempt issues than
to investigating registered issues, an altogether plausible possibility given the
SEC's agenda at the time, the extension of its disclosure requirements to small
firms exempt from its regulation. Such an enforcement policy would make it
impossible to draw any conclusion concerning relative rates of fraud from the
data. And, of course, the initiation of an investigation does not mean that fraud
actually occurred. Second, it is important to ascertain the level of state
antifraud activity against such issuers to determine whether federal intervention
was necessary. Third, even if one accepted Seligman's contention that massive
securities frauds went undeterred by the states and necessitated the enactment
of the federal laws, it is important to determine whether fraud occurred more
frequently in small rather than large firms. Such a finding would indicate that
the lower rate of fraud investigations for firms covered by the 1933 Act would
not be a function of the mandatory disclosure regime, but of the population's
lower underlying occurrence rate.
But the evidence supporting the contention that rampant fraud necessitated
the federal laws is itself quite thin. After reviewing the legislative record and
other sources, Benston concludes, in contrast to Seligman, that there is scant
evidence of fraudulent financial statements prior to the 1934 Act.72 Harold
Bierman has also reviewed the evidence concerning stock market fraud and
manipulation prior to the 1929 crash, scrutinizing in particular the sensational
70. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 16, at 277.
71. See Seligman, supra note 20, at 34-35.
72. See Benston, Evaluation, supra note 37, at 135.
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charges raised against several prominent financiers in the Pecora hearings that
led to the federal securities legislation. He concludes that the hearings and the
attempted prosecutions in their aftermath did not uncover fraudulent or
dishonest behavior on Wall Street and that the amount of manipulation in the
1920s was "surprisingly small. 73 More important, a recent empirical study
of the operation of stock pools that were a principal focus of the congressional
investigation leading to the enactment of the federal securities laws found no
evidence that the pools manipulated stock prices.74
In short, a fair reading of the empirical literature on the effects of the
federal securities laws points to an expansive regulatory apparatus with no
empirical validation for its most fundamental objectives. The SEC appears to
be a regulatory edifice without foundation. A competitive regulatory system
would put such a characterization to the test, as firms would be able to seek
out the securities regime that investors prefer.
2. Empirical Evidence on Corporate Charter Competition
The most prudent approach to the considerable data reviewed in the
previous subsection, which cast doubt on the efficacy of the federal securities
regime, is to replace the monopolist federal regulator with regulatory
competition. This is, of course, the gist of the market approach embedded in
a system of competitive federalism. To find fault with a market approach one
must maintain that a competitive regulatory setting will do a worse job than
the federal monopolist in achieving the investor-protection goals of securities
regulation. For such a contention to be correct, a further assumption is
required, that the states will engage in a "race for the bottom" and enact rules
that favor promoter-issuers over investors. 7" This assumption cannot be
directly tested because there is at present no competitive regime for securities
laws; besides the national mandates, the governing regime is fixed by the
investor's residence or place of sale. But there is a competitive regime for
corporate charters. The most important data bearing on the question whether
the federal securities regime should be eliminated is, consequently, the research
on the impact on shareholder welfare of state competition for charters. This
research indicates convincingly, in my judgment, that investors are at a
minimum not harmed from the competition and, in all likelihood, benefit from
changes in corporate domicile to states such as Delaware, the leading
incorporation state.
73. BIERMAN, supra note 36, at 133-45.
74. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Stock Pools and the Securities Exchange Act. J. Fis. EcoN.
(forthcoming 1999) (manuscript at 38, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
75. Seligman, for example, asserts that there is a need for mandatory national secunties laws "'because
of the history of state corporate law 'chartermongering." Seligman. supra note 20. at 53-54.
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There have been six event studies of the effect of state competition on
shareholder wealth. The wealth effect is measured by the stock price reaction
to a domicile change. Measured over a variety of time periods and sample
firms, these studies find either a significant positive stock price effect or no
significant price effect upon reincorporation. 76 No study observes a negative
stock price effect. The empirical research on state competition undermines the
race-for-the-bottom argument against eliminating the federal securities
monopoly by demonstrating that choice of jurisdiction does not leave investors
defenseless against unscrupulous promoters.77
The race-for-the-bottom view of state competition is no longer the
consensus view of scholars in the debate over the efficacy of state competition
76. See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Standard in
Corporate Governance, 75 IowA L. REv. 1, 66-67 (1989) (significant positive returns on the event date
and approximately one month before); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The Market for Corporate
Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. BUs. 259, 272-75 (1980) (significant
positive returns two years before the event date); Allen Hyman, The Delaware Controversy-The Legal
Debate, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 368, 385 (1979) (positive returns four days before the event date); Jeffry Netter
& Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The Recent Experience, 18 FIN. McIMT. 29,
35-37 (1989) (positive returns roughly one month around the event date that were significant at the 10%
level only); Romano, supra note 19, at 270-71 (significant positive returns at three-day, one-week and one-
month intervals around the event date); Wang, supra note 19, at 14-18, 21 (significant positive returns for
the full sample over a three-day event interval and significant positive returns for Delaware firms over 40
days before the event date and over a three-day interval if the shareholder meeting date is used as the event
date).
77. In an attempt to explain away the non-negative stock price effects of reincorporation, Lucian
Bebchuk asserts that stock price studies are not probative of whether state competition benefits shareholders
because state competition may produce some provisions that are harmful to shareholders even if the overall
package of provisions is not. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable
Limits on State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1449-50 (1992). This is not a
particularly damaging contention against competition and in favor of a federal monopolist for several
reasons. First, it is the net wealth effect of a code on investors that is important, and that effect is positive
for state corporate law. Second, because state corporation codes are enabling statutes, firms can avoid any
such harmful provisions by customizing their charters or bylaws. See infra text accompanying note 82
(discussing numerous firms' opting out of the Pennsylvania takeover statute). Indeed, Bebehuk does not
identify specific mandatory (hence unavoidable) provisions in state codes that he believes benefit managers
over shareholders. Third, Bebehuk offers no support for the prediction that a federal corporation code would
contain fewer harmful provisions than state codes. An examination of the lobbying process in the corporate
context indicates that the differences between federal and state politics are, in fact, minimal. See infra notes
84-89 and accompanying text. Bebchuk offers two other speculations to refute the validity of the empirical
research, but they are incorrect. His contention (offered to explain insignificant price effects of
reincorporation) that both the original and the destination state's laws are equally harmful to shareholders,
see Bebehuk, supra, at 1449-50, is not borne out by the evidence. Not only do some studies find significant
positive results, see supra note 76, but more important, the legal regimes of the destination states differ
significantly from those of the states of origin: The destination states are more responsive to reincorporating
firms' demands than the originating states in enacting code innovations; and reincorporating firms perceive
significant differences between the legal regimes of the two states and offer them as a reason for moving,
see Romano, supra note 19, at 246-47, 258-60. Bebchuk's other contention (offered to explain positive
stock price effects) that any price effects of reincorporation are due to changes in the firm's business
accompanying or anticipated by the move rather than a reflection of investors' assessment of the new
regime, see Bebchuk, supra, at 1449, while plausible, is not supported by the data. I tested for significant
differences in abnormal returns across reincorporating firms grouped according to such potentially
confounding transactions, where some transactions would be hypothesized to be negative and others
positive, for shareholder wealth, and found none. See Romano, supra note 19, at 272. This finding is strong
evidence that the positive price effects for the full sample in my study were due to investors' positive
assessments of the domicile change and not of the accompanying or anticipated transactions.
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for corporate charters precisely because its advocates cannot provide tangible
proof that competition is, in general, harmful to investors. There is no reason
to expect state competition to operate differently for securities law than it does
for corporate law. The informational efficiency of capital markets and the
dominant presence of institutional investors in such markets ensure that the
content of legal regimes will be impounded in the cost of capital, whether they
concern only corporate governance or include securities transactions.
Accordingly, if mandatory securities rules benefit shareholders, notwithstanding
the absence of empirical support in their favor, then competitive federalism
will produce mandatory rules as well.
This is not to say that state competition is perfect. In the 1980s, when
hostile takeovers emerged as a mechanism for changing control and,
correlatively, for replacing incumbent management, the vast majority of states
enacted laws that attempted to lower the probability of a hostile takeover.
Because shareholders receive substantial premiums in hostile takeovers, most
commentators hypothesized that the objective of these statutes was not to
enhance shareholder welfare, but to entrench management.7S Indeed, some
antitakeover statutes made explicit their non-shareholder-wealth-maximization
objectives. Such laws, referred to as "other constituency statutes," permit
management to consider interests other than those of shareholders (that is,
factors besides the offered price) in deciding whether to oppose a bid. 9
Consistent with the view that restricting hostile takeovers is not beneficial
to shareholders, the enactment of antitakeover laws produced negative or
statistically insignificant stock price reactions8W Delaware, with the largest
78. See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL. supra note 16, at 220-22. Some commentators contended.
however, that takeover defenses benefited shareholders by solving a coordination problem created by
dispersed stock ownership and thereby enabling managers to negotiate higher bid pnces. See. e.g.. Lucian
Arye Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standardfor Takeover Policy, 17 J. .GAL. STUD. 197 (1988); William
J. Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs. Shark Repellents. and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against
Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 341.
79. For an analysis of these statutes, see Roberta Romano. What Is the alue of Other Constituency
Statutes to Shareholders?, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 533 (1993). 1 found these statutes had no significant stock
price effect on the specific legislative event dates and within two-day event intervals. See id. at 537. John
C. Alexander et al., however, found a significant negative price effect (for firms without poison pills or
antitakeover charter amendments) for two of the statutes that I examined when a longer event interval of
two days before and three days after was used, and for a third statute, enacted by Indiana in 1989. that was
improperly included in their sample because Indiana had had an other-constituency statute in effect since
1986. See John C. Alexander et al., Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes and Shareholder Wealth. A Note.
21 J. BANKING & FIN. 417, 427 (1997). In fact, I found a negative effect for the earlier Indiana statute, see
Romano, supra, at 539, but it is not a "clean" statute in that it was passed with another antitakeover
provision. I did not find any difference for firms with or without defensive tactics in place, but the sample
was not subdivided by firm characteristics for each state statute separately, and therefore the results cannot
be compared. In addition, my sample consisted of larger firms, as it was constructed solely from NYSE
listings while Alexander et al. include firms traded on the American Stock Exchange and NASD's
Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ). Because at least one study has found that it is small firms that
experience negative price effects from takeover statutes, see M. Andrew Fields & Janet M. Todd, Firm Size.
Antitakeover Charter Amendments, and the Effect of State Antitakeover Legislation. 21 MANAGERIAL FIN.
35 (1995), the difference in the studies' samples may explain the difference in the results.
80. The most comprehensive study, which finds a small but significant negative stock price effect, is
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stake in the chartering business, stands out, however, as an anomaly in the
takeover statute legislative process. In contrast to its position as an innovator
in corporation code provisions, in the takeover context Delaware was a laggard
behind other states, and its regulation is considerably less restrictive of bids.8
More important, charter competition limits the extent to which states can
restrict takeovers: When Pennsylvania enacted what was considered to be a
draconian statute, a majority of firms opted out of its coverage because of
demands made by their investors, who raised the prospect of selling their
shares and reinvesting in firms incorporated in states with no statutes or less
restrictive statutes, such as California and Delaware.82 Consequently, other
states did not adopt the Pennsylvania statute.
83
There is also no evidence that a monopolist-regulator enforcing one
national corporation law would produce better takeover regulation than the
states. Quite to the contrary, in all likelihood a monopolist regulator would
make the situation worse. The political dynamics of takeover regulation at the
state level would be unchanged at the national level. The groups that are
influential in state politics outside of Delaware-local firm managers-are as
influential in Washington. They provide, for instance, the bulk of the witnesses
testifying for takeover regulation.8 In addition, members of Congress whose
districts included hostile takeover targets were the principal advocates for
antitakeover legislation,8 just as states with hostile targets were the enactors
of similar protective legislation.86 Moreover, the congressional legislation on
takeovers enacted under the securities laws, the Williams Act,87 paralleling
the state statutes, favors incumbent managers over bidders by delaying bids,
and the overwhelming majority of bills introduced concerning federal takeover
regulation since the Williams Act have sought to make hostile bids more
difficult.88
Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation State Takeover
Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (1989), which assesses 40 statutes. ROMANO, supra note 4, at 60-69,
reviews the empirical research on takeover statutes and shareholder wealth.
81. Correspondingly, in contrast to the antitakeover statutes of other states, the Delaware statute did
not have a negative stock price effect. See John S. Jahera, Jr. & William Pugh, State Takeover Legislation:
The Case of Delaware, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 410, 416-19 (1991) (finding insignificant or positive returns
over eight two-day event intervals); Karpoff & Malatesta, supra note 80, at 315 (finding an insignificant
price effect over a two-day event interval).
82. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 68-69.
83. See id. at 70.
84. See Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. CIN.
L. REv. 457, 485 (1988). Only witnesses employed by the government participated in a greater number of
takeover legislation hearings than corporate managers. See id.
85. See id. at 482-84; Kenneth Lehn & James W. Jones, The Legislative Politics of Hostile Corporate
Takeovers (1987) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
86. See Henry N. Butler, Corporation-Specific Anti-Takeover Statutes and the Market for Corporate
Charters, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 365 passim; Romano, supra note 84, at 461.
87. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968) (amending Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(d), (e),
15 U.S.C. § 78n(d), (e) (1994)).
88. See Romano, supra note 84, at 470-74.
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With only a national law, there would be no safety valve offered by a
competing jurisdiction (such as California and Delaware in the current federal
system of corporate law) to constrain takeover legislation, and a legislative or
judicial mistake would be more difficult to reverse, as Congress moves
considerably more slowly than state legislatures.89 As the experience with
state takeover laws indicates, although in the short run there will be deviations
from the optimum in a federal system, in the longer run competitive pressure
is exerted when states make mistakes, as in the example of firms opting out
of Pennsylvania's takeover statute. Such pressure is absent in an exclusive one-
regulator system.
The empirical literature concerning the efficacy of state competition for
corporate charters has been my focus of analysis, not only because an
assessment of the efficacy of charter competition underlies the arguments for
and against the market approach to securities regulation, but also because
economic theory provides limited guidance concerning whether a monopolist
will provide the optimal degree of product quality, variety, or innovation,
issues of importance in the regulatory context. Whether a monopolist's choice
of quality is socially optimal depends on the difference between the marginal
and average consumers' willingness to pay for quality, as is true of price-
taking competitors; whether the monopolist will undersupply quality compared
to the competitive market depends on the elasticity of demand. 90 There is a
similar ambiguity concerning whether a monopolist will produce too few or too
many products; the answer again depends on the elasticities of demand and
whether the goods in question are substitutes.
9
1
Extending the theory of monopolistic firms to regulators, William P.
Albrecht et al. present a model in which competing regulators, in contrast to
a monopolist (or to collusive regulators), provide efficient regulation when the
89. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 48-49. This explains why Congress did not amend the Williams Act
to restrict takeovers further in the 1980s. Over the course of its lengthy deliberative process on takeover
legislation, the Supreme Court upheld state takeover regulation. see CTS Corp s. Dynamics Corp of Am.
481 U.S. 69, 94 (1987), and firms redirected their lobbying efforts from Congress to the states, which could
provide a target with relief more quickly than Congress. see sources cited supra note 86
90. In other words, while a social planner would set quality by the aserage consumer's saluation
because she looks at all consumers' welfare, the monopolist. concerned with profits and not social surplus.
sets quality by the marginal consumer's valuation because the pnce increase for higher quality can be
passed on to all inframarginal consumers. As the marginal consumer is not likely to be representative of
the population, the monopolist's product quality choice will differ from that of the social planner ( e . it
will undersupply quality if the average valuation exceeds the marginal valuation) The bias in quality
introduced by the monopolist can be identified only if output will be the same in both cases, this is
generally not the case because a monopolist tends to produce less output for a given quality See JEAN
TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 100-02 (1988)
91. When the monopolist can produce only one product because the monopolist cannot appropriate
the net consumer surplus from introducing a new product design, there may be too few products under
monopoly compared to the social optimum: when the monopolist can offer multiple products that are
substitutes, it may introduce "too many" products compared to the social optimum because if it charges
an above-marginal price for one good it can create demand for a second good. which would not exist if
the first good was competitively priced. See id. at 104-05. The analysis concerning the monopolist's choice
for product diversity is substantially the same as that for product innovation
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goods regulated are substitutes.' Although it is most plausible to
conceptualize the products in the securities regulation context as substitutes,
as all states' securities codes are available to all firms, if different states' laws
are appropriate for specific types of firms and diversified investors desire to
hold such firms in fixed proportions, the products could be conceptualized as
complements. Lacking information on demand elasticities for securities laws,
Albrecht et al.'s model is only suggestive of the benefits of the policy
advocated in this Article, and we must rely instead on the best available
empirical evidence, the evidence from state competition for corporate charters.
Charter competition has not resulted in product differentiation across states
(that is, corporate law regimes are substitutes),93 and investors have benefited
from the competition. These data are consistent with the existence of
substantial benefits for investors from opening securities regulation up to
competition as well.
C. How Would State Competition for Securities Regulation Work?
For states to compete in the production of specific laws, a state must
receive some benefit from the activity. In the corporate law setting, the benefit
is financial: States collect franchise tax revenues from locally incorporated
firms. Over the past thirty years, the franchise tax revenue collected by
Delaware, which is the leading incorporation state despite having few local
corporations, averaged 16.7% of its total tax revenue (see Appendix Table 1).
This revenue greatly exceeds what Delaware spends on its corporate law
system. 94 If the regulation of securities transactions depended on the
incorporation state as well, the incentive to obtain franchise tax revenues
would increase, as there would be more dimensions on which a state could
serve its corporate clientele. That is, a state could increase the number of
incorporations, and hence its franchise tax revenues, by offering a desirable
securities regime as well as a desirable corporation code.
An additional potential revenue source for states competing over securities
regulation is filing fees, which accompany the registration of a public offering
92. See William P. Albrecht et al., Regulatory Regimes: The Interdependence of Rules and Regulatory
Structure, in THE INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION AND REGULATION OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY 9, 27
(Andrew W. Lo ed., 1996).
93. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 45-48.
94. The figures in Appendix Table 1 provide a conservative estimate of the profitability of Delaware's
chartering business because they overstate its expenditures by including, in addition to the appropriations
for the Division of Corporations in the Office of the Secretary of State, which administers the corporate
registration process, the total appropriations for the Chancery Court and Delaware Supreme Court, which
hear corporate law cases at trial and on appeal, respectively, although such cases are a fraction of their
caseload. For example, only 30% of Chancery Court cases are corporate law cases. See Chancery Court
High Stakes in Delaware, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 13, 1984, at 32. In addition, the outlays for the Division of
Corporations were separately itemized only after 1972; for the years before 1972, the table includes the
entire appropriation for the Secretary's Office, although in the subsequent years the ratio of the budget for
the Division to the budget for the Office was slightly under 80%.
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of securities. These fees can be substantial, as indicated in Appendix Table 2,
which reproduces the fees collected by the SEC over the past thirty years for
the registration of securities and various other filings.95 Since 1983, the SEC's
fee collections have been more than 100%, often more than 200%, of its gross
outlays.96 As a monopolist, the SEC has been able to charge a higher fee for
registration than could competitive states, but competition need not drive such
fees to zero. Delaware, for instance, charges higher incorporation fees than
other states and is still the leading incorporation state-a phenomenon
indicating that firms are willing to pay a premium for a superior legal
product.
97
Securities transaction taxes could be a further source of revenue, as they
would accrue to the securities-regulating state, but the competitiveness of
capital markets has constrained states from imposing substantial taxes on share
transfers. The trend in European countries, for example, has been to reduce or
eliminate securities transaction taxes because of competition for stock exchange
business. 98  Annual securities domicile franchise fees, analogous to
incorporation franchise fees, would be preferable to securities transaction taxes
as a revenue source, however, because they are assessed per firm, rather than
according to individual trades, and will thus not adversely affect liquidity by
deterring particular transactions.
The financial incentives generating state charter competition have resulted
in a race that has tended to the top in corporate law. This result suggests that
it would be beneficial for investors to create similar financial incentives for
states in the securities law context. Presently, however, states have little of
value to offer firms in return for the payment of securities "franchise" taxes.
State securities case law is not as extensive as that for corporate law because
95. The bulk of the SEC's fee revenue comes from secuntes' registration. For example. in 1996,
securities registered under the 1933 Act accounted for 75% of the agency's fee revenue, and transactions
of covered exchange-listed securities comprised a further 17%. See SEC 1996 Annual Report (visited Jan
5, 1998) <http'/www.sec.gov/asecannrep96/polas.htm>. The figures for fees collected in the 1960s- 1970s
include the fees from the registration of exchanges and brokers as well as secunrites. See. e.g.. 33 SEC
ANN. REP. 149 (1967) (figures for 1965-1967); 36 SEC ANN. REP. 210 (1970) (figures for 1968-1970).
96. See CONGRESSIONAL BuDGET OmVCFE, 104TH CONG.. IST SESS.. MEMORANDUM ON GRO%,"ni OF
FEDERAL USER CHARGES: AN UPDATE (Comm. Print 1995). The SEC's revenue is so great that for many
years it sought to be self-financing. Congress initially refused *is request. prefernng to retnn a system in
which the fees from SEC filings entered into general revenues and the SEC was allocated a budget far
lower than the revenues it produced. In 1996, however, Congress enacted legislanon reducing SEC fees
over time so that eventually the SEC will collect no more in fees than it costs to run the agency. See
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996. Pub. L. No. 104-290, §§ 402-405. 110 Stat. 3416.
3441-44 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 78a, 77f(b), 78ee (Vest 1997)). That statute also restricted states'
ability to charge filing fees for the registration of securities traded on national exchanges, at the same time
as it preempted their ability to regulate such issues' registrations. See id. § 102(a). 102(c)(2)(D). 110 Stat.
at 3417, 3420 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 77r). The change in securities regime advocated in this Article
would reword this restriction, to permit the securities domicile alone to charge such fees. The domicile
would be a state, foreign country, or the SEC, depending on the issuer's selection.
97. See Romano, supra note 19, at 257.
98. See Colin Jamieson, Stamp Duties in the European Community: Harmontsaton by Abohtin;' 1991
BRrr. TAX REV. 318, 318-19.
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until recently the national securities laws have occupied the field, given
expansive interpretations of the federal antifraud provisions by the SEC and
courts and the desirability of using federal courts.99 State securities law is not
a complete void, however, because some litigants began turning to state actions
in the aftermath of the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretations, beginning
in the 1970s, of the federal antifraud provisions.'t° This trend is expected to
increase given Congress's recent tightening of procedural requirements for
federal securities actions,'' unless Congress enacts the proposed preemption
bills. °2
The relative dearth of a developed body of securities case law places states
at a distinct disadvantage in competing for corporations with the federal
government in terms of substantive securities regulation. In choosing their
statutory domicile, corporations place a premium on the presence of
comprehensive case law because a stock of precedents facilitates business
planning: Firms can structure transactions to minimize the possibility of
liability.'0 3 States can, however, compensate for the problem of meager
judicial precedents by formally incorporating federal court decisions
interpreting the national laws, through either legislation or judicial action, to
the extent that the state's statutory language tracks the national laws. This
approach is not novel and has, in fact, been adopted in the corporate law
context: It facilitated the replacement of New Jersey as the leading
incorporation state by Delaware when corporations sought an alternative
statutory domicile after a lame-duck Governor Woodrow Wilson and the
Progressive Party majority in the New Jersey legislature drastically revised the
corporation code. Delaware's judiciary had incorporated New Jersey precedents
in interpreting its code, which was modeled on the former New Jersey
statute.1°4 Moreover, a state such as Delaware, with a specialized corporate
99. See, e.g., THOMAS L. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 769, 773 (3d ed. 1996)
(discussing the courts' expansion of statutory scope). While the 1934 Act provides the federal courts with
exclusive jurisdiction for 1934 Act violations, see 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1994), the 1933 Act does not, see 15
U.S.C. § 77v, and plaintiffs can bring claims under state securities laws for conduct that would be a 1934
Act violation. Nevertheless, the preponderance of securities lawsuits are brought in federal court. See
GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 3, at 3-9 (discussing filing trends in securities legislation).
100. See, e.g., Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 474-77 (1977) (holding that a breach of
fiduciary duty was not a violation of federal securities law); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
201 (1976) (requiring scienter for liability under federal securities fraud statutes).
101. For an overview of the advantages to investors of bringing securities claims in state rather than
federal courts, see Mare I. Steinberg, The Emergence of State Securities Laws: Partly Sunny Skies for
Investors, 62 U. CIN. L. REv. 395, 418-27 (1993). Grundfest and Perino note the incentives created by the
1995 Reform Act for plaintiffs to use state courts. See GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 3, at 39.
102. See sources cited supra note 2.
103. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 32-34 (discussing how firms reincorporate to reduce litigation
costs); Romano, supra note 19, at 249-51 (same).
104. See Wilmington City Ry. v. People's Ry., 47 A. 245, 251 (Del. Ch. 1900). For a more recent
example of this approach, see Santa Fe Hills Golf & Country Club v. Safehi Realty Co., 349 S.W.2d 27,
34-35 (Mo. 1961).
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law court, can compensate for the dearth of precedents by offering litigants the
prospect of far greater judicial expertise than the federal courts.
The limited experience of states with securities regulation is one important
reason for maintaining a federal government option-at a minimum as a
transitional mechanism-in the context of creating competitive federalism for
securities law in contrast to corporate law, for which there is no analogous
federal code in the United States. It is, however, probable that opening
securities regulation up to state competition would enhance Delaware's
dominant position as an incorporation state. This is because, to the extent that
the national securities laws have been accurately taken to task for requiring
costly and excessive disclosure and fostering frivolous antifraud litigation,
Delaware, in all likelihood, would offer a securities regime that mitigates these
problems.
Delaware's fiscal prosperity depends to a significant extent upon providing
rules that reduce firms' costs of doing business. As a small state, it would not
have indigenous income sources to replace the substantial revenue it derives
from the franchise tax were it to lose incorporations to a state more responsive
to business needs. This motivation is a key to Delaware's chartering market
success: Delaware's reliance on franchise tax revenues serves as a commitment
device to ensure firms that it will continue to enact legislation that firms desire
(statutes that maintain share values as new business conditions warrant code
revision).'0 5 Such a commitment device is critical to the production of
corporate charters because a corporate charter is a relational contract, extending
over many years during which unforeseen contingencies are likely to arise.
Such uncertainty makes it difficult for contracting parties to specify in advance
their obligations, and, as performance is not simultaneous, the possibility of
opportunistic breach is increased. In particular, firms select their domicile and
pay franchise taxes based on the extant legal regime and run the risk that as
business conditions change thereafter, the state will not adapt its code (or will
repeal key provisions to firms' disadvantage). The opportunism problem of
relational contracting is exacerbated when one of the contracting parties is the
state, given its role as the enforcer of contracts through the court system.
Delaware has surmounted the commitment problem by investing in assets
that have no value outside of the chartering market, thereby guaranteeing to
firms that it will continue to be responsive in its code after they incorporate.
These assets include its specialized corporate court system and a reputation for
responsiveness dependent on its high ratio of franchise taxes to total tax
revenues. To the extent that Delaware can gain further franchise revenues from
crafting a responsive securities regime, the same factors will operate in the
105. For the details of the argument, see ROMANO. supra note 4. at 38; and Romano. supra note 19.
at 240-42.
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securities, as in the chartering, context, and Delaware will have stronger
incentives than the SEC to find the desirable regulatory balance.
D. Regulatory Innovation and Competition: Variety and Uniformity in State
Securities Laws
A more traditionally articulated benefit of federalism that is integrally
related to the incentive effects of competition is that it permits experimentation
in legal rules, as states implement different solutions to specific problems.
This, in fact, occurs in the corporate chartering context. Successful corporate
law innovations diffuse rapidly across the states."° For instance, to address
a perceived crisis in directors' and officers' liability insurance in the mid-
1980s, states enacted a variety of statutory approaches, including permitting
firms to cap or eliminate monetary liability of outside directors for negligence
and changing the fiduciary duty standard of care from negligence to willful
misconduct or recklessness."° Within a few years, the vast majority of states
copied Delaware's approach, permitting charter amendments to eliminate
liability.
t0 8
There is, however, far greater variation in state approaches to securities
regulation than to corporate law, which has tended to uniformity in key default
provisions through the diffusion of statutory innovations.1t 9 For example,
some states have merit review regimes, which condition securities' registration
on their meeting a standard of investment worthiness or merit, while the
majority of states employ a disclosure approach, similar to the federal
securities laws." The distinction across state securities regimes is not, after
all, entirely clear-cut, because merit review for compliance with the investment
standard can take the form of requiring greater disclosure of aspects of an issue
viewed with disfavor by the regulator, rather than denial of registration."'
106. See William J. Carney, Federalism and Corporate Law: A Non-Delaware View of the Results of
Competition, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES ON
ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 153, 172-74 (Joseph McCahery ct al. eds.,
1996); Romano, supra note 19, at 233-35.
107. See Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY
L.J. 1155, 1160-61 (1990).
108. See id.; see also Carney, supra note 106, at 167. Finns that reincorporated in Delaware to take
advantage of the limited liability statute experienced positive returns, while event studies of the enactment
of Delaware's limited liability statute, and of firms' charter amendments to opt into the statute, do not pick
up a significant (positive or negative) price effect. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 19-24.
109. See Carney, supra note 106, at 165, 174-75; Romano, supra note 19, at 235.
110. See Ad Hoc Subcomm. on Merit Regulation of the State Regulation of Sec. Comm. of the Am.
Bar Ass'n, Report on State Merit Regulation of Securities Offerings, 41 BUS. LAW. 785, 790 (1986)
[hereinafter ABA Report]. Variation in states' approaches to securities regulation dates from the initiation
of state securities laws at the turn of the century, when only a subset of the states adopted merit regulation
modeled after Kansas's pioneering blue sky law (another name for state securities laws), which predated
the federal legislation. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 TEX.
L. REv. 347, 377-80 (1991).
111. See ABA Report, supra note 110, at 823.
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In addition, the import of the difference is limited because only a subset of
securities are subject to state regulation; nationally traded shares are excluded,
and individual exemptions are often granted." 2 Investors can also avoid a
home state's merit review regime: If a security is not registered in their state,
they can acquire it in an unsolicited secondary market transaction rather than
in the initial public offering." 3
The absence of competition in the securities field probably accounts for the
greater variation in regulatory approach across the states than in corporate
law. 14 But the limited applicability of the states' registration regimes is
undoubtedly also a factor, for where the vast majority of investors prefer a
particular regime, competition will produce incentives for regulators to choose
that regime. Accordingly, if the variation in securities regulation is due, for
instance, to regulators' preference for merit review differing from that of
investors, in a competitive system merit regulation would not survive. In fact,
even in the absence of regulatory competition, merit regulation has been on the
decline, for, in addition to the expanding number of exemptions from coverage
under merit regimes, several important states, such as Illinois, eliminated their
merit review provisions in the 1980s."'
The empirical research on state securities laws does not provide much
support for merit regulation. Studies find that securities sold in non-merit-
review states have higher returns and greater risk than those sold in merit
review states;" 6 while this result is what merit regulators set out to
accomplish, there is no evidence that the reduction in risk is desirable.
Specifically, there is no evidence that securities risk is positively correlated
with fraud, that investments in non-merit-review states are subject to more
112. See id. at 796 (describing exemptions for issues traded on national exchanges or registered with
the SEC); Kevin G. Salwen, State Laws Are Often Overkill, Some Say, WALL ST. J., July 20. 1987. at 35
(describing individual exemptions). Of course, these issues are not exempt from the states' antifraud
statutes.
113. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(3), 7B U.L.A. 601 (1985) (providing an unsolictted offer exemption
for securities resales).
114. Saul Levmore offers two explanations of variety in legal rules that suggest that differences would
remain across securities regimes even in the presence of competition. Vanety exists because the rules "do
not much matter or ... raise issues about which reasonable people (even in the same culture) could
disagree." Saul Levmore, Variety and Uniformity in the Treatment of the Good-Faith Purchaser 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 43, 44 (1987). If reasonable people can disagree over which securities regime best safeguards
investors against fraud and low-quality investments, competition would not eliminate ment regulation but
rather would preserve it, as investors (and hence firms) self-selected across states, choosing the regime that
they considered preferable for protecting their financial interest. In addition, if the adoption of either ment
review or disclosure regulation does not differentially affect the level of investor fraud, then the choice of
regime would not matter and variety could be preserved, although, as Levmore notes. the commercial needs
of a national market would press toward uniformity despite the inconsequential effect of vanety. See id.
at 60.
115. See, e.g., ABA Report, supra note 110. at 786 (reporting that Illinois and Louisiana abandoned
merit review in 1983 and 1985, respectively).
116. See DAVID J. BROPHY & JOSEPH A. VERGA. TIE INFLUENCE OF MERIT REGULATION ON TIE
RETURN PERFORMANCE OF INMAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS (University of Michigan Sch of Bus. Admin.
Working Paper 91-19, 1991) (reviewing other studies and presenting new data).
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instances of fraud than those registered in merit review states, or that investors
residing in merit review states are more risk-averse, uninformed, or financially
unsophisticated than those in non-merit states. The absence of a showing of
significant benefits to investors from merit regulation suggests that opening
state securities regulation up to competition would hasten its demise.
The probability that competition will hasten the demise of merit regulation
is important because it sheds light on a potential concern over abandoning the
mandatory federal system: Would investors be harmed by a subsequent loss of
standardized disclosure across firms governed potentially by fifty-plus regimes?
Competitive federalism does not necessarily increase variation in the legal
regime. State charter competition has, in fact, produced substantial uniformity
across corporate codes, preserving variety in its enabling approach to rules, an
approach that permits firms to customize their charters if the default provisions
of the statutes are not suitable.'" 7 This situation is likely to be true for
competitive disclosure regimes, as the most desirable disclosure standards
would diffuse across the states.
More important, the most significant area of standardization, firms'
financial reporting, would still be controlled by the private sector under the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and thus be consistent across
firms complying with its rules. States could require compliance with FASB
standards to assist firms' needs for uniformity,s"' or stock exchanges could
perform a standardizing function, as they did prior to the enactment of the
federal regime, by requiring listing firms to comply with FASB or their own
disclosure requirements. Even without such requirements, most firms would
comply with most FASB standards voluntarily to reduce their cost of capital,
just as firms at times disclose information beyond that required by regulators
today." 9 It is important to note that although the SEC does not exercise any
statutory control over the FASB, it has authority to promulgate accounting
rules, 120 and it has thereby exerted significant influence over FASB by the
threat that it would adopt its own standards if FASB would not act.
121
Because the market approach eliminates the SEC's prescription of accounting
rules for any firms other than those voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction,
its power to influence FASB standards would be greatly reduced under the
proposal.
117. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at I.
118. In fact, most states currently recognize FASB as the accounting standards-setter through their
regulation of public accountants. State accounting boards, which license public accountants, control
accountants' activities by identifying sources of generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and
enforcing compliance with such principles through ethics regulations, which typically recognize the FASB
as the authority on GAAP. See PAUL B.W. MILLER ET AL., THE FASB: THE PEOPLE, THE PROCESS, AND
THE POLmcs 22 (3d ed. 1994).
119. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1994).
121. See PELHAM GORE, THE FASB CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK PROJECT 1973-1985, at 18,22(1992).
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When competition is introduced into securities regulation, specific rules
will undoubtedly develop that differ from those imposed by the SEC, even
under state disclosure regimes, as states experiment to find the regime most
attractive to registering firms. This could be accomplished by two routes:
enactment of substantively different rules from SEC rules; or application to
securities laws of the enabling approach taken by corporate law, in which state
securities laws (which may or may not be the sime as SEC rules) would
operate as default rules from which firms could opt out if they so chose.
Where a majority of firms opt out of a default, the state obtains information
concerning the appropriateness of that rule, and eventually the rule is revised
by that state or another state that obtains new registrations (and hence
increased revenue) by enacting the more desirable default.''" Analogous to
the states' offering of special statutes for small firms, referred to as close
corporation statutes, in the chartering context, with competitive securities
regulation, a state could further offer firms a menu of regimes from which to
choose (such as the choice of an extensive disclosure regime, a more limited
disclosure regime, and a merit review regime).
If the SEC's rules are optimal, as its supporters contend, then either firms
will not opt out of SEC coverage or they will opt into state securities regimes
that are identical to the SEC's regime. But if all states simply mimicked the
SEC's rules, the benefits from enacting the market approach would be reduced:
Although needed regime revisions would be more speedily undertaken as a
state regulator would act more quickly than the SEC to update its code to meet
investor preferences, investors would bear increased transaction costs under
competition; firms would have to inform investors, or investors would
otherwise have to learn, of the firms' securities domicile choice. The absence
of empirical support for the rationales underlying federal regulation, important
instances of misguided SEC disclosure policy, and persistent concerns voiced
over frivolous litigation suggest, however, that the particulars of securities
regulation under competition will differ significantly from the present federal
regime.
E. Alternative Market- Oriented Proposals
There are two alternatives to the competitive federalism approach to
securities regulation advocated in this Article that are also market-oriented:
eliminating the mandatory features of the federal regime by converting the
federal securities laws into default provisions from which firms could opt out,
122. An example of a default rule change in state corporation codes is the default for preemptive
rights. In the earliest corporation codes, shareholders had these nghts unless a firm expressly opted out of
them in its charter, whereas in modem codes these rights exist only if the firm expressly includes them in
its charter. See Samuel Arsht & Walter Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law. Substantive
Changes, 23 Bus. LAw. 75, 76-77 (1967).
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analogous to the enabling form of corporation codes; and replacing the
government regulatory apparatus with a private, exchange-based regulatory
regime.1 23 Both of these alternatives harness market-based incentives to the
regulatory system. Neither is precluded by this Article's multiple-regulator
approach.
1. A Federal Default Regime
In a federal default regime, firms that did not wish to be governed by
particular SEC rules or statutory provisions could specify alternative provisions
in their corporate charters or bylaws (or in the indenture contracts for debt
securities). Congress would either specify itself, or delegate to the SEC to
determine, which securities regulations, if any, a firm must opt out of by a
charter, as opposed to bylaw, amendment. 24 A default system would clearly
be more desirable than the present one-size-fits-all regime, which is difficult
to change because consensus must be developed among all participants
regarding a new rule, even if their needs are quite different. For example, the
SEC has been surveying registrants with a view to updating its rules regulating
shareholder proxy proposals, and on the question whether to retain the current
voting thresholds for a proposal's resubmission, ten corporate respondents
produced eight different threshold proposals."z A lack of consensus among
firms on such a matter is of far lesser import under a default system because
firms can obtain the threshold level most appropriate for their shareholder
configuration by provision in their charter or bylaws.
Under an enabling approach, if a default rule is suboptimal (that is, the
rule's compliance costs outweigh benefits to investors), the majority of firms
will elect not to be subject to the rule. Assuming the SEC became informed
of firms' choices, perhaps by a requirement that firms file securities "charters"
with the agency so that it could track deviations from the defaults, this market
response would feed back into the SEC's decisionmaking process, leading it
to readjust its beliefs concerning what regulation was most appropriate and,
ultimately, to alter the default rule to one more compatible with investors'
needs, just as would occur with state competition. There would also be a
potential benefit compared to state competition for securities regulation:
Transaction costs would be reduced because investors would not have to
determine which regime governs their transactions. But if the SEC is not
attentive in updating its defaults, there would be little savings in transaction
123. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 107.
124. The difference between charter and bylaw amendment is that state corporation codes require
shareholder approval of changes to the charter, but not to the bylaws. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
109 (1996) (bylaw amendment); id. § 242(b) (charter amendment).
125. See Some of Surveyed Firms Show Consensus on "Cracker Barrel, " Other Issues, 29 Sec. Reg.
& L. Rep. (BNA) 567, 569 (Apr. 25, 1997).
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costs, because investors would have to identify whether a firm were operating
under particular outdated SEC defaults or its own alternatives.
An enabling national regime would be preferable to the current mandatory
one, but, in my judgment, a competitive system of securities regulation is even
more preferable. State competition would not preclude a national enabling
regime, as the federal government could adopt an enabling regime in
competition with the states, as may any or all states. But state competition
would provide an additional benefit over a federal enabling regime: There
would be a straightforward mechanism by which regulators learn of firms'
adoption of statutory defaults. Under regulatory competition, there would be
some variety in defaults across states, even if key innovations diffuse over time
across the states, as has occurred in the corporate law context. This
phenomenon would accelerate regulators' identification of the rules most
desired by investors, as more firms would register in the states with the more
desirable default rules. This would also reduce investors' transaction costs of
learning whether a firm has customized an outdated default.
A further benefit of state competition compared to a federal enabling
regime would be a more rapid updating of undesirable defaults because of
financial incentives. A state such as Delaware would be considerably more
attentive to the need to reduce the transaction costs generated by obsolete
defaults than the SEC, because of the state's financial dependence on the
relevant franchise taxes. Because firms have no alternative regulator in the
monopolist enabling regime, the SEC is not exposed to the same code-updating
incentives as would be experienced by states-declining revenues due to
declining registrations. 2 6 The pressure experienced by the SEC from global
competition, whether under an enabling statute or the mandatory regime
currently in effect, is quite weak because resort solely to foreign capital
markets for financing is not a viable option for publicly traded U.S. firms. The
best evidence that global competition is not as effective a motivator for the
SEC as direct domestic regulatory competition comes from the regulation of
derivative securities. In the derivatives regulatory context, where the SEC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the derivatives disclosures of publicly traded
domestic companies, it has been minimally responsive to issuers' concerns
126. A regulatory monopoly affords the SEC the opportunity to implement policies favoring the
interests of financial market professionals rather than investors. See. e.g.. PHILUPS & ZECiER. supra note
33, at 22-23 (discussing disclosure policies); David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, Regulanon on
Demand: A Private Interest Model. with an Application to Insider Trading Regulaton. 30 J.L & Eco..
311, 318-30 (1987) (discussing insider-trading regulation). Market professionals benefit from receiving free
information from firms under the SEC's mandatory disclosure policies, and from the absence in the market
of more informed traders under the insider-trading prohibition. Regulatory capture by market professionals
would be more difficult under the market approach to securities regulation because corporations would opt
for the regime more congenial to investors, as the providers of capital direct their funds to firms in those
regimes; correspondingly, regulators sensitive to the number of corporations subject to their jurisdiction
would adapt their rules to the preferences of investors, rather than to those of market professionals.
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about regulatory costs and competitiveness. 127 Where the SEC competes with
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) for jurisdiction, however,
it has shifted from an initial position of opposing equity derivative products to
one encouraging and promoting innovation by its regulatees, stock exchanges,
to facilitate their competition against the futures exchanges regulated by the
CFTC.
28
A final potential benefit of state competition compared to an enabling
national regime turns on whether any mandatory rules are desirable in the
securities context, for instance, to facilitate a firm's credible commitment to
investors that it will not engage in opportunistic behavior by altering a
securities default to one offering less protection after the investments are
made. 29 Mandatory rules could not be effectuated satisfactorily under a
national enabling approach. For if the national enabling regime consisted of a
mix of defaults and mandatory provisions, then we would be left with the
problem endemic in the current monopolist-regulator setup: There would be no
127. See SEC Derivatives Disclosure, supra note 54, at 6054-62 (describing minor changes made in
response to comment letters on the proposal and presenting a superficial cost-benefit analysis of the
proposal).
128. See Roberta Romano, The Political Dynamics of Derivative Securities Regulation, 14 YALE J.
ON REG. 279, 354-59 (1997) (discussing the shift in the SEC's approach to product innovation). Some
might attempt to characterize the SEC's loosening of its holding period for the resale of restricted
(unregistered) securities under Rule 144, see Revision of Holding Period Requirements in Rules 144 and
145, 62 Fed. Reg. 9242 (1997) (to be codified at 17 C.FR. pt. 230), as evidence of the SEC's
responsiveness to competitive pressures, since the reform is a recognition by the agency that compliance
costs were too high for small businesses, see id. at 9243-44. In my opinion, this action does not provide
evidence that the SEC is particularly responsive to competitive pressure. The holding period revision took
almost two years to be adopted. Delaware, by contrast, responds to corporate complaints much more
quickly. See Romano, supra note 107, at 1160 (discussing the enactment of a limited liability statute within
one year of an insurance crisis and a controversial judicial opinion). Moreover, the change has had no effect
on the disclosure obligations of the public companies that are the focus of this Article's proposal, as it is
directed at easing 1933 Act offering requirements for small firms and not at easing the continuing reporting
obligations of the 1934 Act. The 1934 Act disclosure obligations have, in contrast to the SEC's moves to
limit 1933 Act coverage, significantly increased over time, as the SEC has come to view the 1934 Act as
the centerpiece of its regulatory authority rather than the 1933 Act, in a policy referred to as "integrated
disclosure." See, e.g., DAVID L. RATNER & THOMAS L. HAZEN, SECURMES REGULATION 129-34 (5th ed.
1996). Finally, and most important, the SEC has sought to eliminate competition and establish its regime
internationally, by identifying harmonization of regulatory standards as a central goal of its policy toward
international securities regulation. See Policy Statement of the Securities and Exchange Commission on
Regulation of International Securities Markets, Exchange Act Release No. 6807, 53 Fed. Reg. 46,963,
46,963 (1988) (stating that regulators should "seek to minimize differences between systems"). Although
the SEC's policy statement also asserted that regulators should be "sensitive to cultural differences and
national sovereignty concerns," id., this is belied by the SEC's implementation of the policy at home, where
it requires foreign firms to reconcile their financial statements with GAAP in order to list in the United
States, see infra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
129. Jeffrey Gordon has advanced this argument in the corporate law context. See Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1573-75 (1989). I remain skeptical,
however, of a justification for mandatory rules involving promoters' needs for a commitment device
concerning the stability of the initial domicile choice. See Roberta Romano, Answering the Wrong
Question: The Tenuous Case for Mandatory Corporate Laws, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1599 (1989) (responding
to Gordon's argument). A shareholder vote would be required for a change in securities domicile, as it is
for a change in incorporation state, see infra Subsection II.B.2, and, accordingly, the need for mandatory
rules as a commitment device would be minimal because the successful occurrence of an opportunistic
relocation would be extremely remote.
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mechanism to check whether the mandatory provisions were, in fact, the ones
that investors would voluntarily choose. Multiple regulators would permit
mandatory provisions without the consequent costs, as such provisions could
vary across jurisdictions, and information would therefore be provided
concerning which provisions were desirable through the registration decisions
of firms.
2. Regulation by Exchanges
A more decidedly deregulatory approach would be to leave securities
regulation to the stock exchanges on which firms list.' 30 In such a regime,
exchange-listing conditions would include the substantive content of securities
laws, such as periodic disclosure requirements. Exchanges can solve free rider
problems concerning information production encountered by individual firms,
as well as coordination problems presented by investors' need for standardized
disclosure. Thus exchanges could replace the government as the solution to a
securities market failure. Indeed, much of the disclosure predating the 1934
Act discussed by Benston was an NYSE listing requirement.' 31 Moreover,
multiple exchanges compete for listings. To the extent that maximizing trading
volume is a function of listings, exchanges would be subject to the same
incentives as states competing for charters, leading them to adopt listing
requirements preferred by investors (or to shares discounted accordingly).,
32
As with a national default regime, an exchange-based regime would be
likely to save transaction costs compared to state competition, because
investors are directly informed of which regime applies when they trade
shares.' 33 But there could still be a regulatory role for the states in an
exchange-regulated system. Although the over-the-counter market for the
largest stocks, NASD's Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ), is a
sufficiently developed regulatory organization capable of offering its own
securities regime, if the NASDAQ regime were poorly suited for the smallest
130. For a recent article advocating this approach, see Paul G. Mahoney. The Exchange as Regulator.
83 VA. L. REv. 1453 (1997).
131. See Benston, Evaluation, supra note 37. at 133. Paul Mahoney provides a detailed descnption
of the NYSE's pre-SEC disclosure requirements. See Mahoney, supra note 130. at 1466.
132. See Fischel, supra note 31, at 125; Mahoney. supra note 130. at 1459. Amihud and Mendelson
argue that exchanges would provide trading rules that benefit investors only if firms, and not exchanges,
choose where a security is listed (in the context of multiple listing of shares or the trading of denvative
securities). See Amihud & Mendelson. supra note 31. at 1442-46. The issues of interest here. however,
involve issuer-shareholder transactions and not trading rules. The concerns of Amihud and Mendelson and
other critics of exchange self-regulation (which focus on exchanges' mismatched incentives regarding
trading rules that can exploit investors, see. e.g., Mahoney, supra note 130. at 1462-63). are thus not
relevant to the discussion.
133. The transaction cost savings would obviously be reduced if a firm's shares were traded on more
than one exchange. Even if the secondary exchange were to adopt a regime that recognized the primary
exchange's rules as governing all issuer shares regardless of transaction location. investors still would have
to know which exchange was the primary one.
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firms traded over-the-counter ("bulletin board" and "pink sheet" issues), it
might be more cost-effective for a state, rather than for the firms' market
makers to organize and operate a separate securities regime.
State regulation would, however, offer some decided benefits over stock
exchange regulation: a more effective mechanism of private dispute resolution
for securities suits against issuers, and a public enforcement system, should the
deterrent effect of criminal prosecution for securities law violations be a
necessary complement to civil liability. Class action litigation is not well-suited
for private arbitration,"3 and it is not surprising that arbitration programs
currently administered by exchanges resolve individual complaints against
brokers, not class complaints against issuers. As a consequence, even when
courts have permitted classwide arbitration, they have retained substantial
judicial involvement, including the initial determination of the certifiability of
the class and review of the settlement. 35 Thus, state or federal courts would
be required to enforce the exchanges' regulatory regime. This creates two
difficulties. First, the use of tribunals not operated by exchanges externalizes
the cost of their legal proceedings, which is a disadvantage from a social
welfare, as opposed to investor, perspective. With state securities regulation,
the fees the states earn in the registration process would defray the costs of
administering securities cases.
Second, regulatory competition is most effective when the sovereign's
jurisdiction includes both the court and the legislature. Canada, for instance,
has not developed a vigorous charter competition across the provinces in large
part because the provincial governments do not control the adjudication of
corporate law disputes; securities administrators (of any province) and the
national supreme court share that authority with the incorporation
province. 136 This renders it impossible for a province to guarantee a
responsive legal regime to prospective incorporators, because a securities
administrator can impose obligations on firms countermanding provincial laws.
A similar difficulty would be experienced by exchanges that were unable to
134. The hybrid use of courts and arbitrators in class arbitration suggests some of the difficulties. See,
e.g., Keating v. Superior Court, 645 P.2d 1192, 1214-18 (Cal. 1982) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (describing
problems with class arbitration). For a discussion of these and other difficulties by proponents of arbitration,
see G. Richard Shell, Arbitration and Corporate Governance, 67 N.C. L. REv. 517, 551, 553-55, 561
(1989); and Note, Classvide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 VA. L. REv.
787, 799, 805-06 (1981).
135. See Keating, 645 P.2d at 1209-10 (holding that judicial involvement in class arbitration Includes
determination of certification and notice to class, supervision of the adequacy of counsel, and dismissal or
settlement, and remanding to the trial court to determine the feasibility of the class); Lewis v. Prudential
Bache Sec., 235 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75-76 (Ct. App. 1986) (finding class arbitration feasible, and leaving to the
trial court the determination of all issues necessary to certify the class and to provide proper notice); Izzi
v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315, 322 & n.6 (Ct. App. 1986) (remanding to the trial court to
determine certifiability of the arbitration class and noting the preferability of court determination of any
class action problems involving notice and discovery). None of the cases permitting classwide arbitration
has involved securities law claims.
136. See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive Corporate Law
Market, 36 MCGILL LJ. 130, 182-84 (1991).
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adjudicate all of the disputes arising under their securities regimes. This
problem is, in fact, raised in a weaker form even under the competitive
federalism proposal advocated in this Article, for unless firms adopt forum
clauses specifying that all securities claims are to be adjudicated in courts of
their securities domicile, investors would be able to file in non-domicile courts.
Although these courts would apply the law of the domicile, they might lack the
expertise to adjudicate disputes as effectively as the domicile. 37 In sum,
regulation by exchanges will at best be a dual regulatory system, with much
of the enforcement of exchange rules performed by the government.
38
It is important to note that state competition for securities regulation would
not preclude exchange-based regulation. A state could, for instance, adopt a
securities regime only for non-exchange-traded corporations, or enact no
mandatory disclosure requirements at all, thereby leaving the determination of
such requirements to exchanges. Because such an outcome would be within the
realm of possible outcomes under competitive federalism, the prudent approach
to regulatory policy reform would be to implement incremental
experimentation: Replace the current monopolist regulator with state
competition and permit the competitive process to reach the judgment that an
exchange-based securities regime provides a set of rules as good as or more
optimal than those provided by the states.
II. IMPLEMENTING THE MARKET APPROACH TO SECURITIES REGULATION
Operationalizing a market approach to securities regulation for issuers
requires two legislative reforms. The first and more straightforward reform is
to make the federal securities laws optional. This could be achieved by an act
of Congress. Alternatively, the SEC could cede its exclusive authority over
public corporations under its newly granted exemptive power. 39 This
solution is, however, akin to asking the agency to put itself out of business,
behavior that would be decidedly out of character for an agency that has
historically sought to increase, not to decrease, its jurisdictional scope. ' In
addition, an act of Congress expressly eliminating the SEC's exclusive
regulatory authority over publicly traded firms is the preferable course of
action because the statute creating the SEC's exemptive authority also
preempted the states from applying registration requirements to nationally
137. See infra Section II.A; Subsection III.A.2.
138. Cf. Mahoney, supra note 130, at 1498-99 (discussing the need for government assistance in
deterring exchange-regulation fraud).
139. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, § 105. 110 Stat.
3416, 3423 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 77z-3. 78mm (West 1997)).
140. For an analysis of the SEC's failed effort to expand its jurisdiction to include derivative secunties,
see Romano, supra note 128, at 355-80.
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traded securities.141 The facial inconsistency between using the exemption to
increase state authority when Congress was otherwise reducing state authority
would provide opponents of the market approach to securities regulation
reform the opportunity to use litigation to delay, if not defeat, its
implementation.
The second major policy reform, adapting the choice-of-law rule governing
securities transactions (site of sale) to one compatible with competition (issuer
domicile), could be more complicated to accomplish because it would entail
coordination by the states to adopt a new rule. It would therefore be more
expedient for the congressional legislation making the federal regime optional
also to institute the requisite change in choice of law, and this Article
advocates such an approach. But because Congress has not typically legislated
choice-of-law rules, this part of the Article not only explains the requisite
change, but also justifies its adoption and critiques the reigning conflicts
approach.
Two additional requirements for the successful implementation of the
proposal are also discussed in this part: disclosure of the securities domicile
to the purchaser of a security at the time of the purchase and a shareholder
vote to accomplish a change in securities domicile. These refinements would
ensure that the new market-oriented regime meets the stated goal of the federal
securities laws: investor protection.
A. An Internal Affairs Approach to the Choice-of-Law Rule
for Securities Transactions
With a market approach to securities regulation, only one sovereign's law
can apply to an issuer's securities transactions. This means that only one
state's securities law would govern securities transactions when the SEC option
is not invoked. Similarly, when the SEC regulatory option were selected, it
would preempt all state securities regulation, including antifraud provisions.
The state with legislative jurisdiction 141 must be connected to the issuer to
ensure that state competition operates properly-that one state's law governs
and that it is the state chosen by the issuer. This would necessitate recrafting
the reigning choice-of-law approach, which follows the site of the securities
transaction and not the issuer's domicile.
141. See National Securities Markets Improvement Act § 102, 110 Stat. at 3417 (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 77r).
142. I adopt here terminology more commonly used in the international, as opposed to domestic, law
setting: Legislative or prescriptive jurisdiction is "the authority of a state to make its laws applicable to
particular conduct, relationships or status" (whether or not that state is the forum state), GARY B. BORN,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTs 491 (3d ed. 1996), as distinct from judicial
jurisdiction, the power of a court to adjudicate a dispute, which, for U.S. courts, requires both personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, see id. at 1-2. The federal securities laws confer both
prescriptive and subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts.
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1. Applicability of the Internal Affairs Approach to Securities
Transactions
The prevailing choice-of-law approach to securities transactions is codified
in provisions of the Uniform Securities Act: The applicable law is that of the
site of the transaction, which is the state in which either the offer or the
acceptance to buy the security takes place."4 3 More than one state can claim
legislative jurisdiction over a transaction under this approach, and the state
whose law governs is not connected to the issuer.
The present choice-of-law rule, under which the securities law varies
across a firm's stockholders based on where they purchased their shares, has
a number of undesirable consequences for a legal system. These include lack
of uniform treatment across similarly situated individuals and unpredictable
standards of conduct for issuers, given the possible application of fifty-one
(state and D.C.) statutes. These difficulties are, in fact, on occasion presented
as the reason for the federal securities laws in cases involving the states'
overlapping jurisdiction with the federal regime, such as the regulation of
broker-dealers.'" In the corporation code setting, the operational problems
created by an absence of uniformity and predictability due to multistate
shareholders are eliminated because the choice-of-law rule recognized by all
of the states fixes one state's law, that of the incorporation state, as governing
all shareholders' claims. This choice-of-law rule is referred to as the "internal
affairs doctrine," because the subject matter of corporate law is characterized
as the internal affairs of the corporation.145
The rationale for application of the internal affairs rule to corporate law
disputes is equally applicable to the choice of law for securities transactions.
In particular, choice-of-law commentators justify the internal affairs doctrine
by the need for uniform treatment of shareholders. For example:
It would be intolerable for different holders of the same issue of stock
to have different sets of rights and duties by reason of their
stockholdings, perhaps according to the laws of the various places at
which they acquired their stock. Unity of treatment is desirable, and
the only single law by which it can be achieved is that of the
corporation's domicile.
146
143. See UNIF. SEC. ACT § 414, 7B U.L.A. 672 (1985); see also. e.g. CAL CORP CODE § 25008
(Deering 1997) (codifying section 414).
144. See, e.g., Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co.. 676 N.E2d 241, 246 (111. App Ct. 1996) (refusing
to apply state law to claims against a broker because such application %%ould frustrate. if not destroy. the
goal of federal uniformity, and stating that "if uniformity is not to prevail, neither rule lOb-10 nor the SEC
would serve any function or purpose in regulating disclosure").
145. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAw § 302 (197 1).
146. ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 700 (4th ed. 1986) For a similar analysis
by a choice-of-law scholar who specializes in corporate law issues. sce P. John Kozyns. Some Observations
on State Regulation of Multistate Takeovers-Controlling Choice of Low Through the Commerce Clause.
14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499, 509-11 (1989).
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The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Law similarly stresses as the rationale
for preserving the internal affairs rule the need for "[u]niform treatment of
directors, officers and shareholders... which can only be attained by having
[their] rights and liabilities.., governed by a single law."'47 The Supreme
Court has also followed this approach in considering whether state takeover laws
violate the Commerce Clause. The Court's validation of such statutes depends
critically on a state's exclusive legislative jurisdiction as the incorporation state
(that is, on the internal affairs rule), which avoids the impermissible risk of a
corporation's encountering "inconsistent regulation by different States." 4 '
Application of the internal affairs rule to securities transactions should go
further than covering litigation arising from initial public offerings under state
registration requirements and should include secondary market trading. Fraud
claims against an issuer should be uniformly adjudicated across investors. It is
even more troubling to differentiate fraud claims from corporate internal affairs
than to differentiate securities registration requirements from corporate law.
There is no plausible rationale for distinguishing a fiduciary standard of conduct
to govern an officer's or director's judgment concerning a corporate transaction,
such as payment of a dividend or undertaking a merger, from that officer's or
director's judgment concerning disclosure about the firm's performance in a
public document. Nor is there a rationale for permitting the differentiation of
such standards across shareholders. Yet choice-of-law rules establish the
application of one state's (the incorporation state's) standard to fiduciary duties
in corporate law but leave the latter decision on disclosure to vary with the
investor's domicile, even though a duty of full and fair disclosure is at the heart
of the fiduciary duties of state corporate law. Such intellectual incoherence
concerning fiduciary conduct is the fallout of current choice-of-law doctrine.
The bizarre possibility of fiduciary standards differing across shareholders
according to their residence (or other location of their stock purchase or sale)
has not yet been the focus of legislators' or commentators' attention because
there have not been many cases involving conflicting fiduciary standards: The
vast majority of securities claims are brought in federal court and settled. 49
In particular, the problem of certifying.a class when the standard of liability
depends on the shareholder's domicile or investment contract situs has not
been raised with any frequency in the securities context, in contrast to the mass
tort product liability context. 50 If securities cases are filed increasingly in
147. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 302 cmt. e.
148. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). For an analysis of the relation
of the CTS decision to the corporate choice-of-law rule, see Kozyris, supra note 146, passim.
149. See Vincent E. O'Brien, A Study of Class Action Securities Fraud Cases 1988-1996, at 4 (visited
Dec. 28, 1997) <http:llwww.lecg.comstudy2.htm#att>; see also GRUNDFEST & PERINO, supra note 3, at
9,31.
150. Cf Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249-50 (1997) (affirming the appellate
court's rejection of an asbestos class action settlement for failing to meet statutory class requirements, and
suggesting that the predominance of common issues that is a problem in mass tort litigation may not be
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state, rather than federal, courts, whether in response to the 1995 securities
litigation reform' or for other reasons, such as a more amenable settlement
process,52 then the class certification issue will take on a pressing
importance. Beyond accomplishing this Article's immediate aim of
empowering investors by creating a competitive regulatory regime, extending
the internal affairs rule to state securities fraud claims would have the salutary
effect of disposing of a thorny substantive law problem of varying liability
standards, thereby ensuring that a class could be certified.
An additional salutary effect of following an internal affairs approach to
securities regulation would be eliminating the potential problem of under-
enforcement with multiple potential regulators. Without such an approach,
ambiguity in regulatory responsibility can lead to regulatory free riding, as
each regulator expects another regulator to be responsible. This is an increasing
possibility with the expansion of Internet trading.153 The internal affairs rule
specifies precisely one regulator, the issuer's securities domicile, thereby
removing the free-riding problem.
2. Flaws in the Reigning Choice-of-Law Approach to Securities
Transactions
Conflict-of-law scholars typically rationalize the disparate choice-of-law
approach to securities law that .insulates state regulation of transactions in
foreign corporations' shares from application of the internal affairs rule by
contending that individual securities transactions do not implicate concerns
a problem in securities fraud). In a small number of securities cases, the courts have referred to the class
certification issue in passing and largely ignored it when certifying the federal class, adding, on occasion,
the proviso that the class could be decertified or divided up at a later date if individual state law issues
presented a problem. See, e.g., Lubin v. Sybedon Corp., 688 F. Supp. 1425. 1460-61 (S.D. Cal. 1988)
(holding that for purposes of the state securities claim, the federal class, if certified, would need to be
divided into subclasses of California and non-California investors); Veinberger v. Jackson, 102 F.R.D. 839,
847 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (certifying a class despite the assertion that a need for individual determinations of
state law applicable to members' claims would overwhelm the commonality of the class, by finding the
assertion of a conflicts problem premature as the defendants did not show that there was a true conflict
among states' interests). Moreover, when the federal suit thereafter settled, there was either no mention of
the individual state law determination issue, see, e.g.. Weinbergr v. Jackson, No. C-89-2301-CAL, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3938 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 1991). or the federal class was certified without any mention
of the need to subdivide it for the state claims, see, e.g.. In re U.S. Grant Hotel Assoc. Sec. Litig.. 740 F.
Supp. 1460, 1464 (S.D. Cal. 1990) (declaring settlement of the Lubin v. Sybedon Corp. litigation).
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein, 116 S. Ct. 873 (1996). in which a state court settlement
disposed of federal securities claims, did not raise the multijunsdictional issue, because the state class
action was a corporate law claim for breach of fiduciary duty and thus only one state's law applied to the
class members. See id. at 882.
151. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the 1995 Act on filings).
152. See Marcel Kahan & Linda Silberman, Matsushita and BeYond: The Role ofState Courts in Class
Actions Involving Exclusive Federal Claims, 1996 SuP. CT. RE\,. 219, 234-48 (discussing use of state cous
to settle federal claims).
153. Cf Clay Harris, European Regulators Probe Defunct 'Vrtual' Brokerage. FIN". TIMES. Dec. 22.
1997, at 16 (reporting that an Internet broker that sold U.S. over-the-counter shares globally was being
investigated by four nations' regulators after operations ceased).
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about uniformity."5 The explanation advanced for the distinction has two
prongs: (1) In stock transactions, the individual purchasers are not yet
shareholders (i.e., not members of the "corporate community") and therefore
the transaction can be characterized as having purely local effect, which is said
to give the buyer's domicile state an interest in regulation more significant than
that of the issuer's state; and (2) a corporation can avoid a state's regulation
by not selling its shares in that state, and thus need not be subject to
inconsistent regulations. 55 The choice-of-law distinction between corporate
and securities law is a legerdemain, but it has a certain practicality: It is more
feasible for a corporation to issue fifty different disclosure statements to
accompany the registration of securities than it is to operate with fifty different
policies on dividend payouts and voting rights.
The flaw in the choice-of-law analysis that distinguishes corporate and
securities laws is, however, easy enough to identify. The common shares of a
corporation are the same in whatever state they are sold, and it is arbitrary to
apply different criteria to transactions in the same securities simply because of
differences in purchasers' residences. Indeed, securities litigation between
investors and issuers is not individualized litigation: Management's defective
disclosures are not differentially or personally directed at particular investors
in the anonymity of modem capital markets, and the composition of the class
of affected shareholders (those who entered into transactions in the relevant
interval) is therefore fortuitous. In short, neither the prospective feature of the
shareholder relation for a buyer of new securities nor the voluntary choice of
selling securities in particular states can be characterized as individualizing the
multiparty context of the corporate contract sufficiently to overcome the
desirability of regulatory uniformity across security transactions for the issuer,
as well as for investors, as they bear the increased cost of compliance with a
panoply of regimes.
The demand for uniform and consistent treatment across investors is, in
fact, recognized by the states' voluntary refusal to exercise regulatory authority
over the securities of interstate (exchange-traded) corporations. The shift in
legal regime from mandatory to optional federal coverage would not alter the
desirability of this approach. Just as the federal law has trumped securities
choice-of-law analysis under the exemptive policy of the state statutes, where
a public corporation has chosen a specific state over the SEC as its securities
regulator, registration requirements should be governed by that state's law.
Moreover, the limitation of a court's exercise of local legislative
jurisdiction by a contract's choice-of-law clause's selection of a foreign state
154. See, e.g., RESTrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 302 Cmt. e (1971); Kozyris, supra
note 146, at 520-21.
155. See Kozyris, supra note 146, at 521.
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is well-established. 5 6 Although there are specific circumstances when courts
refuse to enforce such provisions-when there are defects in contract clause
formation, such as when the contracts are unconscionable adhesion contracts,
or when the contracts contravene the public policy of the state that would
otherwise exert legislative jurisdiction' 57-they are not relevant for securities
law transactions. First, given the multiplicity of investment choices, securities
transactions are not adhesion contracts. In addition, the proposed notice
requirement concerning which state's law applies'58 would render highly
improbable the possibility that an investor's agreement to a choice-of-law
clause was fraudulently obtained. Second, securities transactions specifying the
governing law of a state other than the buyer's state are also not contracts in
contravention of public policy, the enforcement of which would deprive the
plaintiff of an adequate remedy. Even in the remote possibility that the chosen
securities domicile had no securities regulation at all, the absence of an
appropriate remedy would not be an issue because a defrauded purchaser could
still pursue a complaint under that state's common law fraud and fiduciary
doctrines.
59
The conventional conflicts-of-law objection to application of an internal-
affairs-type doctrine to securities transactions, which is captured by the public
policy exception to choice-of-law clause enforcement and to requirements that
the chosen state have a reasonable connection to the transaction or the parties,
is that the investor's domiciliary state has a more important "interest" in a
securities dispute than the issuer's domicile. ' The policy concern that is
confusedly asserted as a state's "interest" in this instance is that the issuer's
state will not provide an adequately protective regulatory regime against
fraudulent sales practices because the buyers (or a majority of them) are not
its citizens. This concern is founded, however, on a mistaken premise: The
research on state competition for charters indicates that states that compete
156. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 142, at 654-55 (stating that the contemporary approach in U S law
regards choice-of-law provisions as presumptively enforceable). LEFLAR ET AL. supra note 146. at 415-19
(noting that authorities generally both approve of the right of paries to determine themselves what law
governs contracts and prefer this basis for contract choice of law (cting RESTATEhIF.,rr (SECOND) 01-
CONFLICTs OF LAW § 187)).
157. See, e.g., BORN, supra note 142, at 655. 661; LEFLAR ET AL.. supra note 146. at 41-17. cf The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 12-13, 15-16 (1972) (expressing similar concerns in enforcing
a choice-of-forum clause).
158. See discussion infra Subsection II.B.I.
159. See Roby v. Corporation of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353. 1365-66 (2d Ctr 1993) (upholding a United
Kingdom choice-of-law contract provision over federal securities law claims, while noting the adequacy
of remedies in English law). The adequacy-of-the-remedy prong of the Supreme Court's exemptions from
upholding contractual choice-of-law clauses has been raised in securities law cases because the federal
securities laws prohibit waiver of compliance. See 15 US C §§ 77n. 78cc(a) (1994) Were the federal
statutes optional, the anti-waiver provisions would not apply to firms opting out of the federal regime, and
the argument against enforcing a choice-of-law clause would be esen more attenuated than it is at present
160. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 146. at 417 n.18 (discussing the relationship betwcen the
"reasonable relation" requirement and the public policy limttation on choice-of-law clauses under the
Uniform Commercial Code).
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successfully for corporate charters do not enact regimes that diminish
investors' wealth.' 6' Investors would benefit from an internal affairs rule for
securities regulation as well because, as occurs in the chartering market,
investors' preferences drive the regulatory competition. In addition, the
proposed requirement that disclosure of securities domicile must be provided
upon stock purchase 62 would eliminate the concern of the buyer's state that
its citizens were inadequately protected: Domicile notice would ensure that
buyers were informed of which state's regime is applicable. If the regime of
the issuer's state were less favorable to investors than that of the buyer's state,
the investor would pay less for the shares or not purchase them in the first
place. Consequently, a requirement of physical connection to the state to make
contracting parties' choice of law effective makes absolutely no sense in the
securities context.
63
3. Which State Should Be the Securities Domicile?
There are three plausible candidates for the single state whose rules govern
a firm's securities transactions in place of the SEC: (1) a state chosen
specifically for securities regulation by the issuer; (2) the issuer's incorporation
state; and (3) the issuer's principal place of business. The first approach would
be implemented through a choice-of-law clause in the corporation's charter
(and noticed on the security). It would create, in effect, a statutory domicile for
securities law. Under a choice-of-law clause approach, the choice of securities
domicile could vary across a firm's financial instruments, as well as differ
from the firm's statutory domicile (its incorporation state). The other two
approaches operate automatically by the firm's choice of statutory domicile or
headquarters site and hence would not require independent action by the
corporation to effect a securities domicile choice, unless that choice were the
SEC.
The least desirable securities domicile approach is to choose the state of
principal place of business. This is because a physical presence requirement
introduces friction into state competition. When physical and human capital
must be relocated in order to effect a change in legal regime, a firm's decision
to move to a more preferable securities domicile is considerably, if not
prohibitively, more expensive than when such a relocation can be
accomplished by means of a paper filing. Few firms would change domicile
161. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
162. See discussion infra Subsection I1.B.I.
163. The Restatement, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 187 cmt. f (1971), the
Uniform Commercial Code, see U.C.C. § 1-105 (1996), and many states, see, e.g., N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW
§ 5-1401 (Consol. Supp. 1997), recognize that geographic contacts may be unnecessary for parties'
effective choice. See, e.g., LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 146, at 417-18 (discussing the implications of the
New York provision).
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to take advantage of incremental legal improvements under such a domicile
approach compared to the other two approaches and, correspondingly, the
incentives of states to provide securities codes responsive to investor
preferences would be sharply diminished. The difference between the domicile
choice of incorporation state (statutory domicile) and state of physical presence
(referred to as the "sikge reel," the corporation's real or effective seat, in some
European nations) in corporate law is, in fact, a principal reason for the
absence of charter competition across the nations of the European Union
compared to U.S. states.' 6'
Whether the most desirable approach for fostering competition over
securities regulation is the choice-of-law clause or the incorporation state
approach depends, in large part, on whether there are synergies from one
state's administering both the corporate and securities law regimes. This is
because the incorporation state approach harnesses the in-place apparatus of
charter competition to the securities context. In general, such synergies should
be substantial because corporate law expertise readily transfers to securities
law. For instance, with one state's law adjudicating both corporate and
securities issues, the standard for directors' and officers' fiduciary duties,
including disclosure obligations, would be harmonized'6 5 More specifically,
all litigation relating to conduct during hostile takeovers would be governed by
one state's law. In addition, all legal issues concerning shareholder meetings
would be subject to the same legal regime, eliminating the considerable
confusion surrounding the SEC's rules regulating shareholder proxy proposals,
which simultaneously look to state corporate law's allocation of authority
between shareholders and managers and effectively ignore it.'66 Where the
synergies of an incorporation state securities domicile include the expertise of
the judiciary, a firm could adopt a forum clause to ensure that securities claims
are filed in the incorporation state.
67
164. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 132-33.
165. Indeed, two Supreme Court cases interpreting the federal secunues law illustrate the difficulties
created by the two regimes' being distinct. In Basic Inc. %- Levinson. 485 U S. 224. 232-34 (1988). whtle
imposing disclosure duties on managers regarding merger negotiations, the Court rejected as a valid concern
the acquirer's desire for secrecy when nondisclosure for such reasons would not obviously be a breach of
fiduciary duty at state law. In Virginia Bankshares Inc. v. Sandberg. 501 U.S. 1083. 1102-06 (1991). a
case involving proxy statement misstatements, the Court did not find the requisite causation for a private
right of action under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1994). where the complaining
shareholders' votes were not required by state law to authorize the action subject to the proxy solicitation.
The Court left open the question whether there would be sufficient causation if the shareholders lost a state
remedy otherwise available because of the misstatement. See Virginia Bankshares. 501 U.S. at 1107-08.
166. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(l) & (7) (1997) (stating that firms can exclude proposals that
are "not a proper subject for action by security holders" and involving "ordinary business operations"). with
Adoption of Amendments Relating to Proposals by Security Holders. Exchange Act Release No. 12999.
41 Fed. Reg. 52,994 (1976) (permitting, where the subject is not proper for shareholder action, proposals
couched in precatory language because recommendations to the board are not improper actions at state law.
and permitting proposals involving ordinary business, such as employment practices, where they implicate
social policy).
167. Such clauses are presumptively enforced at federal common law and by most states. See Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 593-95 (1991); Michael E. Solimine. Forum -Selection Clauses
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But even if the substantive law synergies were limited in number, there is
a further benefit associated with the incorporation state approach. Litigation
costs would be reduced because the significance of line-drawing over whether
a dispute implicates securities or corporate law is reduced, as the same
sovereign's rules would apply in either scenario.
Although the arguments supporting the choice of incorporation state as the
securities domicile appear to be compelling, there are countervailing
considerations that militate against mandating such an approach rather than
leaving the choice of domicile up to the issuer (the choice-of-law clause
approach). First and most important, the choice-of-law clause approach
obviates the need to guess whether the potential synergies of one regime for
corporate and securities law are substantial-market participants' domicile
choices would provide the information. It is therefore most consistent with the
market approach to securities regulation. Second, given the variety of securities
issued by firms, it is possible that states would specialize in different
securities, and consequently, that firms could benefit from being able to select
different domiciles for different issues. This is particularly relevant for debt
securities, where there are no regulatory synergies with the incorporation state
because corporate law deals solely with manager-shareholder relations.'
Third, permitting a self-standing securities domicile might enhance state
competition, as a state could decide to compete more vigorously for securities
issues than for corporate charters and thus prevent Delaware from being able
to slouch on the securities regime it offers because of its success in obtaining
incorporations.
4. Adapting the Securities Law Choice-of-Law Regime
to the Market Approach
Choice-of-law rules are generally creatures of judicial, rather than
legislative, determination. But statutes may codify choice-of-law rules. For
instance, some states have enacted the Uniform Securities Act's choice-of-law
provisions, which select the most common judge-made choice, the state where
the securities are offered for sale.169 In addition, some states have adopted
and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 51, 63, 69 (1992).
168. See, e.g., Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1985)
(finding that a board breached its fiduciary duty to shareholders by engaging in a takeover defensive tactic
that protected noteholders, whose rights are a matter of contract); Harff v. Kekorian, 324 A.2d 215, 219-20
(Del. Ch. 1974) (stating that bondholders cannot bring a derivative suit), rev'd on other grounds, 347 A.2d
133, 134 (Del. 1975). A corporate code would be relevant for a bond contract only when a corporation is
close to insolvency, for at that point some states might hold that the board's fiduciary duty encompasses
creditors. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Communications Corp., No. 12150, 1991
Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *108 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991) (suggesting that a board's duty shifts away from
shareholders when the company enters the "vicinity of insolvency").
169. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 25008 (West 1997) (codifying UNIF. SEC. ACT. § 414, 7B U.L.A.
672 (1985)).
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choice-of-law clause statutes, which guarantee enforcement of contractual
choice-of-law provisions regardless of standard conflicts rules, such as whether
the contracting parties have any relationship to the state.' Coordinated
statutory action by the states altering the site-of-sale rule to an issuer securities
domicile rule, such as by amendment to the Uniform Securities Act, would be
a more expeditious route than reliance on judicial action for implementing the
new domicile choice-of-law approach.
An even more efficacious alternative than coordinated state statutory action
would be for Congress to legislate the mandatory application of the issuer
domicile approach as the securities transactions choice-of-law rule in the
statute rendering the federal securities regime optional. Although Congress has
not mandated choice-of-law rules, it could do so under its Commerce Clause
and Article IV powers. 7 ' Congressional action is the preferred mechanism
for implementing the securities domicile choice-of-law rule, whether the
incorporation state or choice-of-law clause approach is chosen, because it is the
most expeditious method for achieving that end, as it does not require
coordination by fifty state courts or legislatures.
Coordination can occur-the universal recognition of the internal affairs
approach to corporate law is a prime example-but it takes time. For instance,
most states enforce forum selection clauses; this sea change from an earlier era
when such clauses were considered presumptively invalid has occurred by a
mix of state legislative and judicial action, exemplifying a policy of reciprocity
(that is, the states recognize residents' contracts to litigate in another state)
rather than conscious coordination through adoption of a uniform act.'7 But,
while the gradual shift to acceptance has been led by Supreme Court decisions
upholding such clauses in federal cases over the past two decades,' there
are still some states that do not enforce them. 7 If there is a similar pattern
in the securities context as in the recognition of forum selection
clauses-increasing acceptance of the concept of securities domicile with an
170. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. it. 6, § 2708(c)(i) (1993) (requirng a S100.000 minimum contractual
amount); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-1401 (Consol. Supp. 1997) (requmng a 5250.000 minimum
contractual amount).
171. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 146. at 6. They note:
[A]ssuming that the local law of a particular American state permits one of its courts to act in
a given instance, the only authority which can effectively say that the court may not apply the
law that it chooses is that of the federal government, under the powers delegated to it by the
Federal Constitution.
Idt Although there is a well-established judicial tradition upholding forum clauses in commercial contexts.
including securities transactions, see, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.. 417 U.S. 506. 519-20 (1974); The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 18-19 (1972). to the extent there might be a queston whether
firms opting out of the federal regime can also opt out of the federal court system, the congressional
legislation establishing the market approach should specify that federal courts are to enforce forum clauses
selecting a state court.
172. See Solimine, supra note 167, at 75-76.
173. See cases cited supra note 171.
174. See Solimine, supra note 167, at 55, 63 & n.84 ("lAit least four states explicitly reject ... such
clauses.").
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outstanding small number of holdouts after many years-making the federal
securities regime optional would not engender successful competition in
securities regulation, at a minimum in the short run, because the incentives of
issuers, investors, and regulators are not aligned when the law of the issuer's
selected domicile does not govern all securities transactions.
Congressional enactment of a securities domicile conflicts rule would
shortcut such an evolutionary process by immediately implementing all states'
adherence to the securities domicile choice-of-law approach, and would thereby
preserve the advantages of the market approach. It is, perhaps, ironic that the
byproduct of federal intervention in the states' securities choice-of-law
rulemaking would be a greatly invigorated competitive federalism.,75
B. Refinements to the Implementation of the Market Approach
To ensure that the investor protection goal of the federal securities laws
functions smoothly under the market approach, the congressional legislation
that would render the federal regime optional and would fix an issuer domicile
approach to the states' securities choice-of-law rule should contain two
additional statutory mandates. These statutory requirements would establish
investor safeguards at two critical transactional junctures, one occurring at the
individual investor level and the other at the aggregate firm level. The first
requirement is disclosure of the applicable legal regime (the firm's securities
175. Bruce Hay has criticized adopting a non-buyer-state approach to products liability litigation,
contending that state competition in choice-of-law rules is a more promising alternative approach to
substantive law competition regarding such torts. See Bruce L. Hay, Conflicts of Law and State Competition
in the Product Liability System, 80 GEo. LJ. 617, 617 (1992). He asserts that states' policies of choice-of-
law rules and substantive laws are inversely correlated. Thus, when states can follow a choice-of-law rule
favorable to their citizen-plaintiffs under what is referred to in choice-of-law as the "governmental interests"
approach, they can adopt pro-manufacturer substantive laws to protect in-state firms without harming in-
state consumers. He concludes that this scenario indicates that competition over choice-of-law rules would
produce the optimal level of substantive products liability law, because it would enable states to favor
consumers in the choice-of-law rule and manufacturers in the substantive law. See id. at 651-52.
Hay's analysis is, however, mistaken. The governmental interest approach looks to the state's
substantive policy to determine a state's "interest" in a lawsuit. If a state's law favored defendant-
manufacturers, then a court applying the governmental interest standard would not be able to find that the
state has expressed an interest in protecting its citizen-plaintiffs. It would therefore not be able to choose
a pro-plaintiff state's law to govern the dispute, as Hay expects. As a consequence, Hay's crucial
assumption, that the policy underlying a state's choice-of-law rule would be the inverse of the state's
substantive law, is incorrect; the two policies must be positively correlated. Hence, competition in choice-
of-law rules cannot substitute for substantive law competition in the products liability setting of concern
to Hay, nor in any other substantive law setting. The operation of conflicts-of-law interest analysis prevents
opportunistic choices of inconsistent substantive policies and choice-of-law rules. States can, of course,
compete on both choice-of-law and substantive dimensions, but the choice-of-law rule that benefits
investors in the securities context, an issuer securities domicile rule, is straightforward because it fosters
substantive competition, which advantages investors since their preferences dictate the competitive outcome.
States would thus have an incentive to choose the issuer domicile conflicts rule. But to achieve the full
benefits from competition, one state's use of the internal affairs rule must be recognized by all the other
states to assure that one state's law governs all of a firm's transactions with investors. This means that the
same choice-of-law rule must be uniformly applied as the choice-of-law rule across the states. Over time,
states would probably do so. See supra text accompanying notes 172-174.
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domicile) at the time an investor acquires a security; the second is a vote of
the affected security holders in order to accomplish a change in securities
domicile.
76
1. Disclosure of the Applicable Securities Regime
For state competition to function properly, investors must know what
regime will apply to a particular security. t7 The domicile disclosure
requirement would ensure that this condition holds. To accomplish this notice
function, the securities domicile should be indicated on the instrument (stock
certificate or note), just as corporate law requires that restrictions on share
transferability, to be effective, must be noticed on the stock certificate." But
because investors rarely receive a financial instrument even after purchase
(most stock investments transfer electronically and remain physically held by
the clearinghouse depositary), a further mode of notice is essential. The most
plausible additional means of domicile disclosure would entail a two-pronged
approach, directed at both brokers and firms. First, brokers should be required
to inform prospective buyers of the securities domicile at the time of purchase
(or short sale). As federal broker regulation would not be transferred from the
SEC under the proposed approach, such a requirement could easily be
implemented by agency regulation.
Second, and more important, issuers should be required to disclose their
securities domicile at the time of initial public offerings as a condition of
opting out of the federal regime. The required disclosure should be permitted
to take a variety of forms. Where the issuer's domicile requires use of a
prospectus to sell securities, the federal requirement should be satisfied by
indicating the domicile in that offering document. Where there is no prospectus
176. Albert Breton's theory of competitivc federalism offers a rationale for requiring such provisions.
even though competitive securities regimes would most likely adopt the disclosure and voting requirements
on their own, as a means to ensure the vitality of competition. Breton maintains that a central government
can play a useful role in stabilizing competitive federalism by monitonng state activity to prevent collusion
or "races to the bottom" that would undermine the benefits of competition. See ALBERT BRETON.
COMPErrTvE GOVERNMF.NS: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE 251 (1996). The
two statutory requirements would obviate the need for the central government to monitor actively the
competition over securities regimes. But because a race for the bottom will not occur in the securities
context, given the dynamics of capital markets exemplified by the corporate charter market, it is not
obvious that monitoring by the central government is necessary in this context-
177. Of course, not every investor needs to know a stock's domicile; the informed investors set the
price. This is the meaning of an efficient market. The best available evidence indicates that the U.S. stock
market is efficient regarding publicly available information, which includes an issuer's securities domicile.
See Fama, supra note 55, at 1577, 1607 (stating that event studies, which test the "adjustment of prices to
public announcements," provide the "cleanest evidence on market efficiency"). For general models of
information aggregation through prices with heterogeneously informed investors, see Alan Schwartz &
Louis Wilde, Competitive Equilibria in Markets for Heterogeneous Search Goods Under Imperfect
Information: A Theoretical Analysis with Policy Implicanons. 13 BELL J. ECON. 181 (1982); and sources
cited supra note 2 1.
178. See, e.g., DEL- CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 202(a) (1996).
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or other offering document requirement, the issuer should have to inform the
prospective buyer of the securities domicile in writing, an obligation that could
be satisfied by the issuer's contracting with the underwriting syndicate to
provide the information in writing to prospective purchasers. In addition, for
public offerings of a firm whose securities are already traded and whose
securities domicile imposes periodic reporting requirements, disclosing
securities domicile in the required documents should satisfy the issuer's federal
notice requirement as long as such reports are matters of public record (i.e.,
filed with a state office) and thus available to prospective purchasers. Where
a domicile imposes no periodic reporting requirements, voluntary disclosure of
securities domicile in a public document available on a continuing periodic
basis (such as in an annual financial report or proxy statement sent to
shareholders for the annual meeting to elect directors, in the corporate charter
on file with the Secretary of State, or in a publicly available record kept by the
stock exchange on which the shares trade) should also satisfy the federal
disclosure requirement. These latter forms of disclosure would also suffice for
any issuer responsibility regarding domicile notice to investors who acquire
securitius in secondary trading markets.
Domicile disclosure would not be a costly requirement for issuers under
any of the possible mechanisms that have been outlined. It would also not be
costly for brokers to identify an issuer's securities domicile to prospective
purchasers. But mandating disclosure of securities domicile at the time of a
securities purchase is not clearly necessary to protect investors: Markets will
price significant differences in securities regimes, as sophisticated investors
obtain domicile information prior to their purchases, even were domicile
disclosure not mandated. But, given the historical application of the federal
regime to all securities, mandated domicile disclosure would go a considerable
distance toward mitigating the relatively remote possibility of less sophisticated
investors' not knowing that the federal regime might no longer apply. Because
such confusion is most likely to occur in the initial years following the
adoption of the market approach, the domicile disclosure requirement could be
enacted as a sunset provision, expiring, for example, three years after the
statute's effective date. For securities trading in markets where unsophisticated
investors are predominant, such as penny stocks, the domicile disclosure
requirement could be retained beyond such a transition period, as a protective
measure for such investors.
The domicile disclosure requirement would not mandate disclosure of the
substantive content of the relevant regime. Firms could, of course, provide
such information to investors in their domicile disclosure, but the statutory
requirement would leave acquisition of such details to investors. To the extent
there might be concern that unsophisticated investors might mistakenly assume
that all state regimes contain similar protections and could thereby be duped
into buying penny stocks registered under a regime that institutional investors
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shun, a written disclaimer could be required at the time of such securities'
acquisition, in addition to the domicile disclosure, that would inform investors,
in large print, that "their rights under the securities laws may differ
significantly across the states." Alternatively, a requirement could be fashioned
to disclose the details of a regime's significant differences. I am reluctant to
advocate such an approach given the costly line-drawing questions it is likely
to entail. It would, at minimum, require careful drafting to specify the norm
against which differences are to be measured, such as the rules of a majority
of the states, the old federal regime, and so forth. The prospect of litigation
over the fulfillment of the domicile disclosure requirement under such an
alternative leads me to opt for the more generic disclaimer approach, should
any disclosure beyond the domicile be required.
2. Security Holder Approval of Securities Domicile Changes
A different set of concerns regarding the securities domicile choice is
implicated when an issuer determines to change its securities domicile
midstream than is implicated when a shareholder purchases a security with a
given domicile. Namely, the price the investor paid for its shares will not
reflect the value of the new domicile (unless the change was anticipated at the
time of purchase). This is of concern if corporate insiders can behave
opportunistically and move to a securities domicile that requires less disclosure
or has a lower securities fraud standard than the original regime. Such a move
could shift value away from the public to insiders' shares, assuming, of course,
that outside investors did not anticipate such opportunistic behavior and paid
less for the more protective domicile in the first place.
Insider opportunism regarding domicile choice could be mitigated by
requiring the voting approval of the affected security holders before a domicile
change can be effected. 79 As in the corporate law context, the federal statute
would create a minimum default for the required vote of a simple majority.
Firms wishing to operate under a higher, supermajority voting requirement
would therefore be able to do so. The most practical means of implementing
a supermajority voting requirement would be for the corporation to include
such a rule in its corporate charter (and, if commitment to such a voting rule
was of concern, to subject its repeal to an analogous supermajority vote).
States could also establish higher voting minimum defaults in their securities
codes. A supermajority voting default to accomplish changes in securities
domicile, however, would not be desirable from the global perspective of
competitive federalism: When exit from a regime is too difficult, the signals
179. A change in incorporation state (the firm's statutory domicile) requires a shareholder vote because
it is effected by a merger of the corporation into a subsidiary incorporated in the new domicile state. Under
all state corporation codes, a merger requires shareholder approval. See. e.g.. id. §§ 251-252.
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from migration patterns concerning firms' preferred provisions are weakened,
and the beneficial effects of competition stymied.
A majority voting requirement for securities domicile changes could
ultimately aid insiders. In the absence of a voting requirement, it is possible
that investors would expect value-diminishing moves to occur and pay less for
their shares initially. The presence of a voting requirement would commit
insiders to proposing a domicile change only when the new regime increases
firm value, rather than when the regime disproportionately benefits their own
shares, and, as a consequence, investors would not discount shares for
opportunistic midstream domicile changes. To the extent that promoters value
such a precommitment device, a federal voting requirement may well be
unnecessary because competitive state codes would include such a requirement.
Nevertheless, placing the requirement in the federal statute would create a
more robust commitment device because, as an integral part of the regulatory
regime, it would be difficult to rescind. It is, for example, more difficult to
change congressional than state legislation.
Some commentators contend that shareholder voting is not an effective
safeguard against insider opportunism because it is irrational for shareholders
to vote-that is, an individual shareholder's cost of becoming informed in
order to vote his or her interest outweighs the pro rata benefit he or she will
receive from a correct outcome.' This contention, in my judgment, is vastly
overblown.' 8 In a capital market dominated by institutional investors holding
portfolios of stock, issues are repeatedly raised across portfolio firms, reducing
information costs significantly on any one vote. Moreover, the preferences of
these informed voters-institutional investors-regarding securities regimes
would not conflict with those of uninformed individual investors. This is
because the vast majority of institutional investors, whose choices would
determine the regime, do not possess private information or great skill at
obtaining such information, and they would accordingly not benefit from a
regime that minimizes firms' public disclosures. 82 It is possible that some
180. See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 129, at 1575.
181. In particular, it can be shown that, under plausible assumptions concerning the breakdown of
stock ownership among insiders, outside blockholders, and dispersed investors, a rational strategy for an
uninformed shareholder concerned about the possibility of opportunism would not be the strategy of always
supporting management with "yes" votes, the strategy emphasized by commentators critical of shareholder
voting, but rather a mixed strategy of voting randomly against management's proposals, or a strategy of
not voting at all, leaving the decision to the informed voters. Both of these latter strategies are better than
always voting "no," as well as always voting "yes." See Romano, supra note 129, at 1607-10.
182. Mutual funds, for instance, do not outperform the stock market. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. Ross ET
AL., CoRPoRATE FINANCE 348 (4th ed. 1996). This fact shows that these institutions do not have access
to, or a comparative advantage in processing, private information, and there is little reason to think this
circumstance would change with the switch to a competitive regime. The criticism leveled at relational
investing, in which institutional investors engage in active monitoring of managers, that such investors may
obtain private benefits that generate a conflict between their and other shareholders' interests, thereby
reducing the value of their activism, see Jill E. Fisch, Relationship Investing: Will It Happen? Will It
Work?, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1009, 1040-41 (1994); Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of Relational
Investing, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 987, 989 (1994), is not applicable in our context. The posited private
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institutional investors possess a superior ability to process public information;
such investors would support a high level of disclosure, as that furthers their
competitive advantage.
A probative example of this congruence in interest between institutional
and individual investors regarding disclosure policy concerns the issues sold
to institutional investors under Rule 144A, which exempts such issues from
federal registration and hence the prospectus disclosure requirements of the
1933 Act.183 These issues have come to include disclosures equivalent to
those required in the prospectuses of registered public offerings.' Although
the reason for this phenomenon could be underwriter concern over liability (the
1934 antifraud provisions still apply to such offerings'8), it suggests that
institutional investors find issuer disclosure more cost-effective than reliance
on private information collection.
Voting rights in corporate law are often accompanied by appraisal
(dissenters') rights-the right of dissenters to be cashed out of the firm at a
price set by a court under statutory guidance.'"' Appraisal rights mitigate
adverse outcomes from uninformed voting: Informed shareholders can dissent
and, under the statutory standard, obtain the cash value of their shares equal
to the value "exclusive" of the transaction that was the subject of the vote.'
Thus, for a value-diminishing transaction such as an unfavorable domicile shift,
the share's appraisal value would be the stock price before any adverse effect
from the market's assessment of the value in the new domicile (the outcome
of the vote). Such rights could be mandated for dissenters to a domicile
change. Appraisal rights, however, come with costs, such as the potential for
an unwanted cash drain if many shareholders exercise their rights, the hold-up
power that comes from shareholders' exercising such rights against a non-
value-decreasing proposal, and imprecise valuation of the dissenters' shares
that may over- or undercompensate them.
benefits of such investors arise most frequently from the institutions' holding preferred secunties. see. e.g..
Rock, supra, at 1022, but preferred stockholders do not select the regime for common stock. More
important, the number of institutions that are able to attain such preferred relational positions is quite small
(there are few outside investors equal to Warren Buffett whom managements are willing to trust with the
rights of relational positions), and thus they will not be the marginal investor whose tastes dictate regime
choices. Accordingly, the possibility of a divergence between institutional and retail investors' preferred
securities regime is remote.
183. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A note (1997).
184. See Luis F. Moreno Trevino, Access to U.S. Capital Markets for Foreign Issuers: Rule 144A
Private Placements, 16 Hous. J. INT'L L. 159, 195 (1993).
185. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (Preliminary Notes).
186. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8. § 262 (1996) (providing appraisal rights in conjunction with
mergers, which require shareholder approval); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.02 (1992) (providing appraisal
rights in conjunction with mergers, asset sales, amendments of articles of incorporation that materially and
adversely affect shares by specified impact, and any actions taken pursuant to a shareholder vote where
charter, bylaws, or board resolution provide for such rights).
187. E.g., DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (providing that for merger dissenters entitled to appraisal,
the court should determine "fair value exclusive of any element of value ansing from" the merger).
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There has not been empirical research examining cross-sectionally the
functioning of appraisal rights for charter amendments. Such research could
provide information concerning how frequently such rights are used, what the
stock price reaction is to amendments when the rights are used, and whether
charter amendment proposals and voting outcomes differ systematically across
firms when such rights are present. In states where appraisal rights are not
statutorily provided for dissenters to charter amendments, firms do not appear
to include such rights in their charters.'88 A plausible inference from such
behavior is that appraisal costs outweigh the benefits; either they are an
inadequate remedy for opportunistic amendments or insiders rarely propose
opportunistic charter amendments. Indeed, if midstream opportunism were
rampant, institutional investors would become aware of the practice, and
promoters would have incentives-higher share prices-to bind themselves
against engaging in opportunistic charter amendment by providing appraisal
rights for such votes or otherwise locking in initial charter provisions.
Accordingly, rather than have Congress mandate dissenters' rights in the
securities domicile context, their presence should be left to the decisions of
securities domiciles, which can legislate such rights, and issuers, which can
place such rights in their charters or bylaws if domiciles do not mandate
them.
III. THE REGULATION OF FOREIGN (NON-U.S.) ISSUERS
The desirability of regulatory competition does not stop at national borders,
for the same incentives are at work in a global setting: Financial capital is as
mobile across nations as it is across U.S. states, and capital providers will
require higher returns from investments governed by regimes less protective
of their interests, prodding firms to seek out the securities regime preferred by
investors in order to reduce their cost of capital. 189 The market approach to
securities regulation advocated in this Article should, accordingly, apply
equally to U.S. and non-U.S. issuers of securities.
188. In the course of over a decade of research requiring examination of hundreds of corporate
charters, I have not come across such a provision.
189. Although investors favor their home countries in their portfolio allocations, see Kenneth French
& James Poterba, Investor Diversification and International Equity Markets, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 222, 222
(1991), cross-border flows of capital have dramatically increased over time and are expected to continue
to do so, see ALAN C. SHAPIRO, MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 403-04 (4th ed. 1991). As
financial markets have been deregulated globally, international market capitalizations have increased, and
the benefits of international diversification are becoming widely recognized. See SOLNIK, supra note 10,
at v-vi. For concise reviews in the legal literature of such investment trends, see MACINTOSH, supra note
8, at 6-10; and Merritt Fox, Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom?,
95 MICH. L. REv. 2498, 2523-25 (1997).
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A. Applying the Market Approach to Non-U.S. Issuers
1. The Market Approach
Under the market approach to securities regulation, the issuer's securities
domicile controls for all securities sold in the United States, whether that
domicile is a U.S. state or a foreign nation. This would be a dramatic
turnabout from the SEC's current practice, which assumes jurisdiction over all
transactions occurring in the United States, and until recently, asserted
jurisdiction over foreign transactions involving U.S. citizens," ° analogous to
the states' choice-of-law rule for securities transactions that looks to the sale
location or purchaser domicile.
The SEC's territorial approach to jurisdiction prevents foreign issuers who
are in compliance with their home states' disclosure requirements (which are
less extensive than the SEC's) from listing on U.S. stock exchanges. The
principal reason that the vast majority of non-U.S. firms who could qualify for
exchange trading do not list in the United States is that their disclosure costs
would significantly increase, particularly with respect to accounting data, as
they would have to comply with the SEC's regime."9 ' Although the precise
cost of reconciliation with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP) is not publicly available, James Fanto and Roberta Karmel report that
given compliance costs, companies find a U.S. listing worthwhile only if large
amounts of equity capital (over $300 million) are required.'9 Other data
suggestive of the costliness of reconciliation are that the London Stock
Exchange lists five times the number of foreign firms that the NYSE lists,' 93
and that, after the SEC extended its reporting requirements to foreign firms
trading on the NASDAQ, the number of such listings declined by almost thirty
percent over the following seven years (after having tripled over the seven
years prior to the change)."'
190. See Registration of Foreign Offerings by Domestic Issuers. Exchange Act Release No. 33-4708.
29 Fed. Reg. 9828, 9828 (1964) (stating that requirements of the 1933 Act are "'ntended to protect
American investors"); see also Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Gunnan. Th7e Dangerous Ettraterrtonahrl'
of American Securities Law, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BUS 207. 221 (1997) (discussing the SEC's adoption
of Regulation S, governing overseas transactions, which changed the regulatory emphasis from "the
protection of U.S. investors, wherever they may be located, to the protection of American capital markcts")
191. See James L. Cochrane, Are U.S. Regulatory Requirements for Foreign Firms Appropriate 1. 17
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S58, S61 (1994) (noting that there are "2.000 foreign companies eligible to go on
[NYSE's] list.., were it not for SEC regulattons"); James A Fanto & Roberta S Kaxmel. A Report on
the Attitudes of Foreign Companies Regarding a U.S. Listing. 3 STA'N. J3L BLS & Fis 51, 70 11997)
192. See Fanto & Karmel, supra note 191, at 71. William Baumol and Burton Malkiel point out that
beyond the time and expense entailed in the translation process for GAAP reconciliation, there are
difficulties arising from the fact that GAAP requirements are not adapted to the "circumstances of the
foreign firm," such as the fact that GAAP rules are tailored to U.S. corporate tax rules, which vary
significantly from other nations' taxation. Baumol & Malkiel. supra note 42. at 41
193. See Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 42. at 41.
194. See Edwards. supra note 7. at 63.
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The market approach would open up U.S. markets to non-U.S. issuers.
This is a policy shift that would not only make U.S. securities regulation more
respectful of other nations' policy decisions by reaffirming a norm of
international comity, but would also benefit U.S. investors. They would no
longer have to incur the substantial costs of purchasing shares on foreign
exchanges, as they have been doing in increasing numbers to invest directly
in non-U.S. corporations.' 95
Under the market approach, foreign firms (firms not incorporated in the
United States) would be able to choose their securities domicile for U.S.
trading purposes, and therefore would not need to comply with SEC disclosure
requirements in order to trade in the United States. This result has some
precedent: The Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MDS) adopted by the
SEC and the Ontario and Quebec Securities Commissions in 1991 enables
Canadian firms to trade in the United States by complying with Canadian
disclosure requirements, although they must reconcile their financial data with
GAAP.196 Canada is the only nation with which the SEC has entered into
such an agreement, however, because its disclosure requirements are similar
to U.S. requirements. 97 In addition, the SEC has itself relaxed its disclosure
requirements for non-U.S. firms, including eliminating certain nonfinancial
items such as management compensation and related party transactions. 98
The market approach expands the SEC's MDS without requiring that
disclosure regimes be harmonized with the SEC rules or GAAP reconciliation.
But it goes still further than these precedents: It would render inapplicable to
such issuers the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (unless they
opt for SEC regulation), in contrast to the MDS, which retains U.S. antifraud
liability for Canadian firms. If all nations adopt the market approach, then all
of a firm's shareholders would be subject to the same securities regime,
wherever they purchased their shares, and there would be uniform treatment
of investors, as occurs in the corporate law context. Rather than harmonization
of national securities regimes, the universal application of the market approach
should be the goal of international securities regulation.
The SEC was unwilling to extend the multijurisdictional accord globally
to nations with lower levels of disclosure than it requires because, in its view,
investors in U.S. markets would not be adequately protected if firms traded
without releasing all of the information that SEC and U.S. accounting
standards mandate. There is, however, an absence of evidence that the lower
levels of disclosure in other nations adversely affect investors. Studies of price
195. See id. at 58-59, 63-64.
196. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration and Reporting
System for Canadian Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 6902, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036 (July I, 1991).
197. See RICHARD W. JENNINGS Er AL., SECURmIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 1581 (7th
ed. 1992).
198. See Fanto & Karmel, supra note 191, at 56.
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reactions to foreign issuers' release of information reconciling their financial
reports with GAAP do not consistently find any effects, leading a number of
economists to conclude that the SEC's requirement that foreign firms'
disclosures conform to GAAP is of no benefit to investors.' 99 In addition,
despite the lower level of disclosure required, foreign markets are not less
efficient than U.S. markets. 200 Finally, differences in accounting systems do
not appear to provide less information about firms' financial situations of
importance to investors; for instance, although German accounting is
considerably less rigorous than GAAP, the information it discloses provides as
good a probability estimate of a German firm's bankruptcy as GAAP
information does for U.S. firms.20'
If the lower level of disclosure of other nations were, in fact, of concern
to U.S. investors or adversely affected investments, investors would discount
the shares of foreign firms or not invest in them in the first place. Because of
such a reaction, many firms would voluntarily reveal more information than
required by their home state, albeit less than the SEC would have required,
under the market approach.202 An increase in U.S. listings of non-U.S.
issuers that were covered by less extensive disclosure regimes than the SEC
requires would not, therefore, be harmful to investors and would instead lower
the transaction costs entailed in direct foreign investment. To the extent that
foreign firms chose to list in the United States-to come under the more
stringent SEC disclosure requirements or to subject themselves to the more
extensive U.S. liability regime-as a credible commitment to signal their
quality to investors and thereby to reduce their cost of capital, °3 they could,
of course, continue to do so under the market approach. The credibility of such
firms' commitment to the U.S. regime could be sustained further by their
placing a supermajority voting rule in their corporate charter in order to change
their securities domicile.
2°4
199. See, e.g., Baumol & Malkiel, supra note 42. at 46-50; Edwards. supra note 7. at 65-66 (noting.
however, that more studies must be done before definite conclusions can be reached).
200. See supra text accompanying note 42.
201. See Jorg Baetge, The Role of Disclosure and Auditing as Affecting Corporate Governance,
Presentation at the Symposium on Comparative Corporate Governance at the Max-Planck-lnstitut. Hamburg.
Germany (May 16, 1997).
202. Firms currently respond to such incentives. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41.
203. For signaling explanations of foreign firm listings in the United States. see C. Sherman Cheung
& Jason Lee, Disclosure Environment and Listing on Foreign Stock Exchanges. 19 J. BANKING & FIN. 347
(1995); Oren Fuerst. A Theoretical Analysis of the Investor Protection Regulations: Argument for Global
Listing of Stocks (Feb. 17, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal); and Edward
B. Rock, Mandatory Disclosure as Credible Commitment: Going Public. Opting In. Opting Out. and
Globalization (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
204. To the extent that the SEC requirement for deregistration of fewer than 300 shareholders, see
Rock, supra note 203, at 11-13 (discussing exit routes under SEC rules), would no longer be applicable
under the market regime because it would impede effective junsdictional competition, firms could duplicate
such an exit barrier by placing a similarly worded provision in their charters. Where the firm's home nation
does not recognize a domicile approach and the firm is listed both domestically and in the United States.
the firm could craft a supermajority charter amendment limited to the choice or domicile for U.S.-traded
shares. In the common case in which the foreign firm uses depositary receipts for its U.S. issue. see
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The securities domicile choice of foreign firms available under the market
approach might be limited in practice to a firm's home country (assuming it
does not choose the SEC), in contrast to U.S. firms' choices, because their
home countries' choice-of-law rules might not recognize the legislative
jurisdiction of a nation that is not the site of the securities transaction. For
example, regarding corporate law domicile, many nations do not recognize a
statutory domicile and follow instead a physical presence or "seat" rule.205
If those nations were to follow this principle for securities domicile as well,
then non-U.S. firms would have no securities domicile choice but their home
country (or the United States as the site of the transaction). But even if the
domicile choice were circumscribed because of home country practices, the
number of foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges would markedly increase
under the market approach because it would eliminate the need for such firms
to undertake costly expenditures to comply with the SEC's disclosure regime,
such as the GAAP reconciliation.
2. Securities Litigation Involving Non-U.S. Issuers
There is a potential problem for U.S. investors who invest in firms subject
to a non-U.S. securities regime should they need to seek redress for a
securities law violation. Namely, the collective action problem inherent in any
type of shareholder litigation-the cost of pursuing a lawsuit exceeds a
shareholder's pro rata share of any recovery but not the aggregate award206 -
would be exacerbated by requiring prosecution of a claim in a foreign forum,
both because of the expense and because of the absence of mechanisms for
aggregating claims in many countries.
U.S. investors would, of course, discount the shares of foreign firms
against which they could never exercise their rights under foreign securities
laws or would avoid such securities entirely. Foreign firms might therefore find
it in their self-interest to ensure that U.S. investors could prosecute securities
claims in U.S. courts. The institutional mechanism for obtaining a foreign
corporation's consent to a U.S. court's jurisdiction would not be difficult to
construct: The issuer could provide such a written consent in the
documentation accompanying the sale of stock to a U.S. investor. In addition,
generally Joseph Velli, American Depositary Receipts: An Overview, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. S38 (1994)
(providing an overview of the depositary receipts market), it might be possible for the firm to place a
provision in the service contract entered into with the sponsor of the receipts (which the sponsor would
enforce) either prohibiting a domicile change or requiring a supermajority vote of the American depositary
receipt holders to effect such a change.
205. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 132 (noting that, with the exception of the United Kingdom and
the Netherlands, European nations follow the real seat rule).
206. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in
Shareholder Litigation, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1985, at 5 (discussing the collective action
problem in shareholder litigation).
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U.S. stock exchanges competing for business could require issuers' consent to
jurisdiction in the United States as a listing requirement, if they thought that
such a rule would enhance the value of listed shares and thereby increase
trading interest.
There is, however, a question whether U.S. courts would accept
jurisdiction as a forum state over a securities dispute between investors and an
issuer that is subject to foreign (non-U.S.) securities law. Traditionally, in
international litigation, securities law has been treated as a species of public
law, over which local courts have either declined to exercise jurisdiction or
accepted jurisdiction but applied their own substantive law. The distinction
between public and private law is arcane, and has largely been undone by the
Supreme Court in the securities context through its validation of arbitration
clauses to resolve securities law disputes, reversing the prior convention that
considered arbitration inappropriate for public, as opposed to private, law
subjects. 2 7 Accordingly, in keeping with the contemporary trend merging the
jurisdictional approach in public and private law areas, it would be appropriate
for U.S. courts to apply private law jurisdictional principles to international
securities transactions. °8 In the private law setting, forum selection clauses
are presumptively enforceable,2 9  and the exceptions to this
presumption-defects in contract formation, unreasonableness, and public
policy," 0 as well as the forum non conveniens doctrine-have no relevance
for our context: The foreign defendant will have consented to a U.S. forum,
federal policy will have expressly authorized foreign legislative jurisdiction,
and the plaintiff-investor's local domicile and purchase would provide
sufficient "contact" with a U.S. forum to render the local forum's retention of
jurisdiction both feasible and desirable.
While U.S. jurisdiction would be readily attainable, a more important
question is whether a U.S. court should'exercise jurisdiction at all, or, to put
it another way, is it desirable from the perspective of regulatory competition
for foreign firms to choose a U.S. forum for securities suits? The adjudication
of securities disputes by non-domicile courts could undermine the effectiveness
of competition, as the legislating state does not control the interpretation of its
laws. The problem would not be as severe as it is for Canadian provinces
competing for corporate charters because the U.S. courts would be attempting
in good faith to apply the domicile's law, whereas Canadian securities
administrators intentionally apply their own governance standards rather than
207. See Rodriguez v. Shearson/Am. Express. Inc.. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Shcarson/Am Express. Inc
v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Scherk v. Alberto-Culvcr Co.. 417 U.S 506 (1974) (ovcrruling Wilko
v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)).
208. The Supreme Court's forum selection clause junsprudence has cspecially cmphastzcd the nceds
of parties engaged in international commercial transactions when sustaining partics' contractual choices
See, e.g., The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.. 407 U.S. I. 8-18 (1972).
209. See id. at 17-18; see also supra note 167 and accompanying text.
210. See BORN, supra note 142, at 395.
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the law of the domicile province.2 ' But the difficulty here is not solely a
matter of substantive law interpretation.212 The U.S. approach that adopts the
procedural rules of the forum can have a significant impact on substantive
outcomes because, in addition to class action mechanisms to aggregate
individual claims not prevalent in other countries, U.S. procedure-including
rules on discovery, pleading requirements, contingent fees, and the absence of
a "loser pays" cost rule-are far more favorable to plaintiffs than those of
foreign courts.213
A powerful competing consideration in favor of a U.S. forum and against
the substantive concerns raised by a non-domicile adjudicator is the significant
inconvenience for a U.S. investor to prosecute a securities claim abroad. The
balancing of the factors regarding the appropriateness of a U.S. forum is a
calculation that is best undertaken by the foreign issuer, rather than by
Congress or regulators. As long as investors were informed of the issuer's
choice-of-law and choice-of-forum selections, they would be able to price their
ability to obtain relief for securities violations, and issuers would respond
accordingly, trading off U.S. forum protections that facilitate securities
litigation and affect the cost of capital with the substantive advantages of a
foreign forum.
B. Comparison with Other Reform Proposals
The outcome of applying the market approach to non-U.S. issuers-that
their shares will be able to trade in U.S. markets under a non-U.S. securities
regime-is certainly not a novel idea. Several commentators have advocated
211. See Daniels, supra note 136, at 182-84; see also supra text accompanying note 136.
212. Undercurrent law, U.S. courts have imposed U.S. standards on foreign issuers instead of applying
non-U.S. law in their role as a forum court, in a misguided attempt to protect U.S. investors. See, e.g.,
Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A., 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), modified, 890 F2d 569 (2d Cir.
1989) (applying U.S. law to a takeover contest between foreign firms where the bid permitted U.S.
residents to tender only if they did so from outside the United States); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp.
v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972) (applying U.S. law to a purchase of stock in a British
corporation by a U.S. corporation on the London Stock Exchange). The danger of such conduct's
continuing under the proposed regime is probably low, given that Congress will have expressly authorized
the applicability of non-U.S. law to the transactions.
213. See BORN, supra note 142, at 4. The critical differences in litigation procedures could lead some
foreign issuers to consider an alternative approach to the selection of a convenient forum for disputes, such
as the use of an international arbitration clause. But it is problematic whether investors would place
sufficient value on this approach to make it worthwhile for the issuer to offer arbitration, unless some
features of U.S. litigation practices are retained in the arbitration agreement, such as the use of
representative actions. Although arbitration is less costly than litigation to pursue an individual claim, the
profitability of most securities cases comes from the ability of an attorney to aggregate claims. Despite
potential difficulties in claim aggregation, in the international securities context there is a significant
advantage to arbitration over litigation that may make it highly attractive to U.S. investors: It is easier to
enforce arbitration awards worldwide because virtually all nations (including the United States) are
signatories to the United Nations Convention recognizing arbitration awards, while there is no global treaty
concerning the enforcement of judgments. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITICATION AND
ARBrrRATION 332 (1993).
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reform of the SEC's approach to foreign issuers to enable such issuers' shares
to trade in U.S. markets without coming under the SEC's regulatory regime (or
its more onerous components, such as GAAP reconciliation). ' 4 Some
commentators have simply called for an end to the extraterritorial application
of U.S. securities laws. Depending on the particular concern of the
commentator, the solutions have been to permit foreign firms to list on U.S.
exchanges, or, more narrowly, to permit U.S. investors to participate in foreign
firms' takeovers, without having U.S. law apply,215 or to advocate a strict
territorial (site-of-sale) approach, regardless of the shareholders' ultimate
residence or firms' domicile.2 6 While these proposals resolve the most
214. See, e.g., Cochrane, supra note 191, at S61. S63-65. Fox. supra note 189. at 2582; Memtt Fox.
The Political Economy of Statutory Reach: U.S. Disclosure Rules in a Globalizing Market for Securities
14-15 (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Yale Law Journal).
215. See, e.g., Cochrane, supra note 191, at S61. S63-65 (criticizing applicabilty of SEC disclosure
requirements for NYSE listing); Jill E. Fisch, Imprudent Power: Reconsidering U.S. Regulation of Foreign
Tender Offers, 87 Nw. U. L. REv. 523. 573-74 (1993) (criticizing applicability of the Williams Act); Pinto.
supra note 5, at 73 (same).
216. See, e.g., Choi & Guzman. supra note 190, at 241 (reviewing possible jurisdictional rules.
including site of sale and firms' choice of domicile, and concluding, "This (strict rule of terrtorial
jurisdiction based on the connection the transaction has with the capital markets of the country) is the rule
we advocate"); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, National Laws, International Money: Regulation
in a Global Capital Market, 65 FORDHAm L. REv. 1855. 1895 (1997) (hereinafter Choi & Guzman.
National Laws] ("[W]e propose a clear and simple rule: all transactions that occur through an exchange or
organized market should be considered within the exclusive jurisdictional reach of the country within which
the exchange or organized market operates."). In a recent paper, Choi and Guzman's position has evolved
from advocating a strict territorial (site-of-sale) approach to an approach similar to this Article's issuer
securities domicile approach. See Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman. Portable Reciprocity: Rethinking
the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL L. REv. (forthcoming July 1998).
Choi and Guzman seek to encourage regulatory competition across nations because they believe that
different rules are appropriate for different issuers and investors. One reason for their refusal in their earlier
articles to advocate the logical implication of regulatory competition, an issuer domicile rather than site-of-
sale approach, was that they finessed the question whether regulatory competition is for the "top" or
"bottom" with respect to investor protection. They asserted that the question was complicated and did not
need to be resolved because different rules were appropriate for different chenteles. See. e.g.. Choi &
Guzman, National Laws, supra, at 1876. This is an unsatisfactory position because, if the competitive race
to diversity produced laws disadvantageous to investors (that is, it was a race for the "bottom"), there
would be no demand for such differentiated regimes. Notwithstanding their contention, it only makes sense
to advocate a policy of regulatory diversity if the competition results in regimes that benefit investors (that
is, it is a race for the top).
The inconsistency in Choi and Guzman's initial position becomes more apparent when they sidestep
the implications of a policy of regulatory competition for domestic regulation. Relying on the existing
practice of a monopolist SEC, they contend that either investors and issuers within a single nation have
homogeneous preferences regarding securities regulation or domestic markets do not value diversity
produced by competition, and conclude that the desirability of intemational regulatory competition is
distinguishable from the domestic context. See id. at 1882-83. Their justification of local regulatory
monopolies stems from a mistaken understanding of the dynamics of competitive federalism: Competition
can lead to uniformity as well as diversity in substantive law. Moreover, uniformity produced by regulatory
competition is more likely to be of benefit to investors than uniformity derived from a noncompetitive
regime. See Carney, supra note 106, at 169-72 (comparing uniform corporate law produced competitively
in the U.S. with that produced by noncompetitive European harmonization process). There is. finally, little
evidence that diverse securities regimes are appropriate for U.S. and non-U.S. multinationals, or for U.S.
investors holding such firms, notwithstanding Choi and Guzman's conjecture. Similar product diversity
arguments were hypothesized to explain the benefits of state charter competition, yet the data do not
support such claims. See ROMANO, supra note 4, at 45-48. There is. then. simply no theoretical or empincal
basis for distinguishing between domestic and international secunties regulatory competition.
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egregious problems in the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, to the extent
that they are more restrictive than the domicile approach advocated in this
Article-by limiting their reach to the takeover context or by choosing the site
of sale, which issuers cannot control as easily as domicile-they are
suboptimal when international issues are considered within the broader context
of fostering competitive securities regulation.
In a more comprehensive effort to rationalize international securities
regulation, Merritt Fox contends that an issuer nationality rule (physical
presence domicile) is the rule that maximizes social welfare.2"7 Although the
substantive policy outcomes of Fox's proposal and of this Article may not be
significantly different-that is, non-U.S. issuers trading on a U.S. exchange are
likely to choose their home countries' securities regimes under the market
approach-the rationales are fundamentally at odds. This is because Fox
assumes that international regulatory competition would lead to a "race for the
bottom" regarding disclosure requirements. Fox provides two reasons for this
projected outcome: Firms would not voluntarily produce the desirable level of
financial information because of third-party externality concerns; and U.S.
stock exchanges' interest in increased listings would dominate the regulatory
process, resulting in a lowering of disclosure requirements to enable them to
compete for listings against foreign markets.2"' Fox therefore advocates a
physical presence rule to stymie such regulatory competition. Not only would
firms have to change their nationality in order to change regulators, which is
a costly undertaking, but also exchanges would no longer have an incentive to
lobby for lower local securities standards in order to increase foreign listings,
as listing decisions would be independent of the regulatory regime of the stock
exchange's location.
This Article's proposal for shifting to an issuer-domicile-based rule is
premised on an assessment of competition that is the precise opposite of Fox's.
As discussed earlier,2'9 neither of Fox's rationales depicting destructive
competition holds up to scrutiny. The need to internalize third-party
externalities is a tenuous rationale for securities regulation, and such
externalities are not, in any event, likely to account for the items of mandatory
disclosure pursued by the SEC or the differences across national regimes. More
important, there is no reason to assume that firms would list on the exchange
with the lowest level of disclosure requirements. Rather, they would choose the
one whose requirements lower their cost of capital, which will not be the
exchange operating under the least amount of disclosure because investors
place affirmative value on information. The supporting evidence against the
race-for-the-bottom thesis, as already noted, is that firms the world over
217. See Fox, supra note 189, at 2580-83; Fox, supra note 214, at 14-15.
218. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 214, at 34-35.
219. See supra Section I.B.
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voluntarily release more information than their securities regulators require in
order to raise capital, with the best example being the European firms listing
in London, which voluntarily choose to meet higher local disclosure
requirements.220
Finally, it should also be noted that Fox's concern regarding the political
process in a competitive regulatory setting-the incentives of stock exchanges
to lobby for lowered disclosure-is not relevant under the market approach.
Whether the securities domicile is statutory, contractual, or Fox's proposed
domicile of physical presence, the location of the stock exchange would not
determine the issuer's securities regime; the issuer's securities domicile would.
Accordingly, while Fox's proposed regulatory reform is compatible with the
approach in this Article, the rationales could not be much farther apart.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has advocated fundamental reform of the current strategy
toward securities regulation by implementing a regulatory approach of
competitive federalism, under which firms select their securities regulator from
among the fifty states and the District of Columbia, the SEC, or other nations.
Competitive federalism harnesses the high-powered incentives of markets to
the regulatory state in order to produce regulatory arrangements compatible
with investors' preferences. This is because firms will locate in the domicile
whose regime investors prefer in order to reduce their cost of capital, and
states have financial incentives (such as incorporation and registration fees) to
adapt their securities regimes to firms' locational decisions. This prediction of
securities market participants' and regulators' responses to competition is well-
grounded: There is a substantial literature examining the workings of
competitive federalism in the corporate charter setting that indicates that such
regulatory competition does not harm, and in all likelihood benefits, investors.
To establish competitive federalism in the securities law context, the
current choice-of-law rule for securities transactions must be altered to follow
the issuer's securities domicile rather than the securities' site of sale. In
addition, two procedural safeguards would be required of firms opting out of
federal regulation: domicile disclosure upon securities purchases and a security-
220. See supra text accompanying notes 38-41. One study of foreign stock exchange listings found
an inverse relation between listings and disclosure requirements, but the exchanges with the lowest level
of disclosure did not have the most foreign listings (although the United States. with the highest disclosure
level, did have the fewest foreign listings); more important, the inverse relation was not significant when
domestic and foreign exchange disclosure levels were compared. See Shahrokh M. Saudagaran & Gary C.
Biddle, Financial Disclosure Levels and Foreign Stock Exchange Listing Dectsions. in INTERNATIONAL
CAPITAL MARKErS IN A WORLD OF ACCOUNTING DiFFERE.'cEs 159. 181. 184 (Frederick D.S. Choi &
Richard M. Levich eds., 1994). That is, the data do not support the race-for-the-bottom hypothesis that the
probability of a firm listing on a given foreign exchange is inversely related to the cxchange's disclosure
level when its disclosure level is higher than the disclosure level of the firm's domestic exchange See id
1998] 2427
The Yale Law Journal
holder vbte to effectuate a domicile change. These requirements ensure that
informed investor preferences drive the regulatory competition. When
competition is introduced, SEC rules and regulations that are not cost-effective
or are otherwise detrimental to investors will be replaced by competing
regulators with rules investors prefer, as the domicile choices of capital market
participants establish a new regulatory equilibrium.
The mandatory federal securities regime has been in place for over sixty
years, but the theoretical support for it is thin, and there is no empirical
evidence indicating that it is effective in achieving its stated objectives. In fact,
there is a developing literature pointing in the opposite direction. At a
minimum, this literature suggests that the securities status quo should no longer
be privileged, and that it should instead be opened up to market forces by
means of competitive federalism. Corporation codes have benefited from
precisely such competition. Although the current legislative trend in Congress,
supported by both the proponents and opponents of the existing regulatory
regime, is to seek to monopolize even further securities regulation at the
federal level, this Article maintains that it would be far better public policy to
expand, not restrain, state regulatory involvement. As long as only one state's
law, chosen by the issuer, controls the regulation of a firm's securities
transactions, regulatory competition will emerge, and there are compelling
reasons to prefer such a regulatory arrangement to the mandatory federal
regime.
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FRANcItsE TAXEs ($0O) % OF TOTAL. TAX Cou.Ecr AP OPERATIO (S00)
1966 14,091 109 492
1967 17.615 12.6 517
1968 21,414 14.8 606
1969 20.572 13. 645
1970 43.924 22.5 722
1971 55,212 24.9 836
1972 49.129 19 3 697
1973 50,777 17 1 699
1974 57,073 18.5 984
1975 55.030 164 1051
1976 67,887 389 1208
1977 57.949 148 12-55
1978 60.509 13.5 1385
1979 63.046 128 1482
1980 66.738 129 1899
1981 70,942 12.9 22
1982 76.591 12.9 2448
1983 80.031 12.5 2847
1984 92.270 12.9 2723 1
1985 121.057 148 3242
1986 132,816 I50 3809
1987 152,152 154 4746
1988 180.583 177 4719
1989 195.862 17.3 4873
1990 200201 177 6398
1991 203.868 17.5 6953
1992 297,004 221 6591
1993 284.839 21.3 6831
1994 307,008 21.3 7980
1995 336.348 21.2 7104
1996 350.035 20 7 9462
Sources: U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS. STATE GOVER.NMENT TAX COLLEcTONS (1966-1996); 55-70
Del. Laws (1965-1995). Appropriations for Delaware's chartenng business consist of stale
outlays, for the fiscal year ending June 30, on the Division of Corporations in the Office of
the Secretary of State and on the Supreme and Chancery Courts.
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TABLE 2. THE SEC's FINANCING
[Vol. 107: 2359
YEAR APPROPRIATION ($000) FEES COLLECTED ($000) % FEES TO APPROPRIATION
1966 16,442 6608 40
1967 17,550 9706 55
1968 17,730 14,623 82
1969 18,624 21,996 118
1970 21,905 15,526 71
1971 23.615 16.374 69
1972 26,817 19,000 71
1973 30,293 22,000 73
1974 36,227 22,000 60
1975 44.427 24,000 54
1976 49,000" 26,000 53
1977 56.270 29,000 52
1978 62,475 26,100 42
1979 67,100 33,000 47
1980 72.739 48.000 66
1981 80,200 65,300 81
1982 83.306 78.200 94
1983 86.690 98.600 It0
1984 94,000 121.000 129
1985 106.382 144,000 135
1986 106,323 215,000 202
1987 114.500 263,700 230
1988 135,221 250.000 185
1989 142.640 214,000 150
1990"" 166.633 232,000 139
1991 189.083 259.000 137
1992 225,792 406.000 180
1993 253,235 517.000 204
1994 259.000 593,000 229
1995 267,000 559.000 209
1996 297,400 774,000 260
This figure excludes supplemental appropriations of over $13 million for the transitional quarter,
accommodating change in the fiscal year.
Since 1990, SEC appropriations acts increased registration fees by 0.01% of the offering's dollar
value, with the increase offsetting the SEC's costs rather than going into general revenues.
Sources: SECURTrIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, ANNuAL REPoRTs (1966-1996). Fees collected for
1972-1977 were obtained from Henry 1. Hoffman, Assistant Comptroller of the SEC.
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